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ARTICLE
MAKING SENSE OF DRUG REGULATION:
A THEORY OF LAW FOR DRUG
CONTROL POLICY
Kimani Paul-Emile*
This Article advances a new theory of drug regulation that ad-
dresses two previously unexamined questions: how law-makers are able
to regulate drugs differently irrespective of the dangers the drugs may
pose and independent of their health effects, and the process followed to
achieve this phenomenon. For example, although tobacco products are
the leading cause of preventable death in the United States, they can be
bought and sold legally by adults, while marijuana, a substantially safer
drug, is subject to the highest level of drug control. This Article posits a
conceptual model for making sense of this dissonance and applies this
model to the regulation of four common drugs: cocaine, marijuana, to-
bacco, and anabolic steroids. Although much has been written on the
topic of licit and illicit drug regulation, none of the scholarship in this
literature has attempted to explain through an examination of pharma-
ceutical, illicit, and over-the-counter drugs how the apparent inconsis-
tencies and incoherence of the U.S. system of drug control have been
achieved and sustained. This Article fills the gap in this literature by
proposing an innovative and comprehensive theoretical model for under-
standing how drugs can become "medicalized, " "criminalized" or
deemed appropriate for recreational use, based upon little or no empiri-
cal evidence regarding the pharmacodynamics of the drug.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation of drug users. The prevalence of drug
use in the United States is astounding: from senior citizens who receive
Medicare coverage, the largest group of drug users, to people convicted
of drug offenses, who constitute a substantial portion of the state and
federal prison populace. Today, drugs are consumed by members of
nearly every segment of society and affect every aspect of modem life.'
Due to the sheer ubiquity of drug use today, many Americans may feel
confident that they have a reasonable understanding of how drugs are, or
should be, regulated. Readers may imagine that in a liberal democratic
society, drugs are regulated according to scientific or medical evidence
regarding their dangers and benefits.
In fact, however, drug regulatory decision-making in the United
States over the past 150 years has often borne very little relationship to
science. Many drugs are regulated in ways that belie scientific or medi-
cal evidence regarding their pharmacological characteristics. Tobacco
products, for example, are the leading cause of preventable death in the
United States, 2 yet they can be bought and sold legally by adults, while
marijuana-a significantly safer substance-is a Schedule I controlled
drug and its use is therefore strictly prohibited.3 Similarly, although all
I See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH (2007),
available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/p0000O16.htm#Standard [hereinafter, RESULTS FROM
THE 2007 NAT'L SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH]. See also CLAYTON J. MOSHER &
SCOTT AKINS, DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY: THE CONTROL OF CONSCIOUSNESS ALTERATION
147-168, 171-201 (Diana Breti ed., Sage Publications 2007).
2 See B. Adhikari, Ph.D, et al., Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life
Lost, and Productivity Losses - United States, 2000-2004, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY
REP. 45, 1226-1228 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmi/mm
5745a3.htm; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE: TARGETING THE
NATION'S LEADING KILLER (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/aag/osh.htm.
3 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(c)(Schedule )(c)(10) (2002) (classifying marijuana Schedule I).
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forms of cocaine share the same active ingredients and produce the same
psychotropic effects, simple possession of one particular form of co-
caine-crack-renders one subject to some of the most severe sanctions
available for any drug. 4 Anabolic steroids are controlled substances;
however, their distribution to some people seeking to enhance virility
(particularly elderly men) is permissible, while sale to other healthy peo-
ple seeking the same effects is not.5
The health effects of drug use do not appear to determine how a
particular drug will be regulated. And this raises two questions: how are
regulators able to treat drugs differently, irrespective of the dangers they
may pose, and what processes do they follow to achieve this phenome-
non? The state, at all levels of government, has at its disposal many
regulatory mechanisms to control drug production, consumption and
sale, including: drug scheduling by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA); imposition of state criminal and civil laws and penalties;
market-based strategies, such as production subsidies and taxation; and
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process
and corresponding intellectual property laws, among others. 6 The choice
among these various mechanisms, however, has often not been based on
empirical evidence grounded in science or medicine. Although some
drugs carry substantial health risks and others do not, the amount of risk
posed is not accurately reflected in the regulatory processes selected to
govern each drug. Equally confounding is the fact that the use of these
divergent regulatory mechanisms does not appear to have arisen from
4 See Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine
Laws?, WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121, 142 (1994) (explaining that "[i]n severe con-
trast to the harsh federal sentences for crack possession, a first-time offender possessing any
other illicit drug is not subject to mandatory imprisonment, and faces a maximum sentence of
1 year"); Larry E. Walker, Law and More Disorder! The Disparate Impact of Federal
Mandatory Sentencing for Drug Related Offenses on the Black Community, 10 J. SuFFOLK
ACAD. L. 97, 118 (1995) (explaining that the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 "specifi-
cally identifies one and only one controlled substance, i.e., crack, and attaches penalties in
excess of those generally applied for simple possession"); Gary Fields, Shorter Sentences
Sought for Crack, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124101257332
168605.html (noting the imbalance between crack and powder cocaine sentences). See gener-
ally William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing
Policy, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 1233 (1996).
5 Although nonmedical AAS distribution is a felony and many high profile professional
athletes have, in recent years, been sanctioned for using the drug, AAS are also dispensed with
little regulatory oversight at hundreds of "anti-aging clinics" across the country where older
men go to enhance their virility through hormone replacement therapy. See Bruce Lambert,
Prominent Entertainers Cited in Steroids Inquiry, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.ny
times.com/2008/1Ol/14/nyregionll4albany.html. An estimated one million men participate in
physician-prescribed testosterone replacement therapy. See Leonard S. Marks, et al., Effect of
Testosterone Replacement Therapy on Prostate Tissue in Men with Late-Onset Hypogonad-
ism: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 296 JAMA 2351 (2006); Brian Vastag, Many Questions,
Few Answers for Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 289 JAMA 971 (2003).
6 See infra note 74.
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one overarching goal; nor is it based upon universal principles of public
health or even a unified moral or ethical ideal.
This Article posits a model for making sense of this dissonance.
Although much has been written on the topic of licit and illicit drug regu-
lation, none of the scholarship in this vast literature has attempted to
explain through an examination of pharmaceutical, illicit, and over-the-
counter drugs how the apparent inconsistencies and incoherence of the
U.S. system of drug control have been achieved and sustained. 7 This
Article fills the gap in this literature by proposing an innovative and
comprehensive theoretical model for understanding how drugs become
"medicalized," "criminalized," or deemed appropriate for recreational
use, irrespective of any danger the drugs may pose.
The analytical framework this Article proposes, the "Regulatory Re-
gime/ Norms" model, posits that drugs begin as blank slates onto which
meaning is conferred. Prior to regulatory intervention, the way any par-
ticular drug is perceived or understood is indeterminate and amorphous.
As a result, the project of regulating drugs is about allocating specific
meaning and significance to a drug in order to prompt individuals to
think about the drug in a way that allows for state intervention.8 This is
accomplished by regulatory regimes.
The Regulatory Regime/Norms model identifies three primary regu-
latory regimes used to control drug consumption and sale: the market
regime, public health regime, and criminal regime. Each regime creates
and reinforces specific norms with respect to the drugs it regulates:
moral norms in the criminal regime, disclosure norms in the public
health regime, and assumption of risk and rational choice norms in the
market regime. These norms shape public understanding of drugs and
the regulatory enterprise undertaken by the regime.
In order to have a drug placed in one regime over another, the cor-
porate entities, private reformers, and government actors who compete in
the drug placement process must successfully characterize the drug in a
way that resonates with the norms of the regime that fits their goals. 9
7 See infra Part I.B.
8 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv.
943 (1995) (arguing that in some instances, government regulation constructs social meanings
of the regulated entities).
9 For examples of other scholarship employing frame analysis, see generally ERVING
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974) (intro-
ducing frame analysis and describing its impact on societal understanding); JOSEPH R. Gus-
FIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT
(1963) (invoking frame analysis in an examination of the American Temperance movement);
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRIVING AND THE SYM-
BOLIC ORDER (1981) (using perceptions of drinking-driving to address attitudes towards public
problems); Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental Aliena-
tion Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender and Fathers' Rights, 40 FAM. L. Q. 315 (2006) (using
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The victor in this framing battle will see the drug regulated in its regime
of choice, regardless of whether the drug poses a threat to health or
safety and even if the regime placement decision flouts empirical evi-
dence grounded in medicine or science. Once the drug has been placed,
the regime will legitimate the regulators' characterization of the drug.
Regime placement, however, is not static. A drug will stay in a
regime only so long as the characterization of the drug resonates with the
norms of the regime. Therefore, if popular perception of the drug is no
longer consonant with the norms of its regime, the drug can be moved
out of that regime and into another. If, however, a drug in the criminal
regime is persuasively characterized as being closely associated with so-
cially maligned groups or racial minorities, it is significantly less likely
that the drug will ever migrate out of the criminal regime.
As the Regulatory Regime/Norms model suggests, decisions that
determine which regime a drug will be placed-that is to say, how it will
be regulated-are only occasionally based on the pharmacological
properties of each drug. Drug regulatory decision-making is much more
accurately described as a high-stakes battle over how to persuasively
frame a drug in a way that matches the norms of the regime that satisfies
a particular group's preferences. This framing is the allocation of mean-
ing that precedes the legal or legislative work of drafting laws and regu-
lations. Thus, the act of framing certain drugs to fit in particular regimes
is an inherently political endeavor with material consequences for those
who are regulated and the corporate entities, private reformers and gov-
ernment actors who engage in the designation battles. Regime placement
is determined by the winner in these struggles. Once these drug framing
battles have ended and the victorious group has placed the drug in the
regime of its choice, the norms that structure the regime work to mold
popular understandings of the drug and legitimize the drug's placement
in the regime.
In order to illustrate my Regulatory Regime/Norms model, this Arti-
cle examines the regulation of four common drugs: tobacco, anabolic
steroids, cocaine, and marijuana. These drugs span the spectrum of the
U.S. system of drug control, both in terms of their pharmacological ef-
frame analysis to look at child custody disputes); Howard S. Becker, Becoming A Marihuana
Smoker, 25 Am. J. Soc. 235 (1953) (looking at the reasons behind recreational marijuana use);
Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) (examining the effect of frame analysis on intellectual
property law); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain
and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (discussing the impact of frames on com-
pensation awards); Charlotte Ryan & Samuel Alexander, "Reframing" the Presentation of
Environmental Law and Policy, 33 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 563 (2006) (invoking framing as
a means to analyze and enhance environmental policy); Kathryn L. Tucker & Fred B. Steele,
Patient Choice at the End of Life: Getting the Language Right, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 305 (2007)
(arguing that negative framing used to describe end of life choices undercuts the issue).
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fects and the regulatory mechanisms used to control their production,
consumption and sale. Thus, they demonstrate the complex discontinuity
of U.S. drug regulatory policy. Application of the Regulatory Regime/
Norms model to the regulation of these illicit, over-the-counter and phar-
maceutical drugs provides valuable insight into the long and tortured his-
tory of U.S. drug regulation in a way that previous scholarship has not.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a
brief summary of the regulatory mechanisms used to control drugs in the
United States and situates this Article within the academic literature on
drug regulation. Part II presents my Regulatory Regime/Norms model,
thus laying the foundation for subsequent analysis. This Part introduces
the three primary regulatory regimes employed to control drug manufac-
ture, distribution, and consumption: the criminal, public health, and mar-
ket regimes. Part II also examines the specific norms and ideologies that
are produced and reinforced within each regime (rational choice and as-
sumption of risk, disclosure, and moral norms) and explains the way they
enable regulators to structure particular drugs and drug users as governa-
ble, irrespective of whether the regulatory decision-making is based on
scientific or medical evidence regarding the pharmacological effects of
the drug.
Part III moves this model from the conceptual and theoretical to the
concrete and verifiable by applying the model to the four drugs under
consideration. This Part maps the regulatory battles that are waged over
the regime into which a drug will be placed and explain how drugs are
able to move from one regime to another. In so doing, this Part chroni-
cles how marijuana became "dangerous" and tobacco the socially ap-
proved drug of choice; how one form of cocaine was distinguished from
all others notwithstanding their similar pharmacodynamics; and how ana-
bolic steroids were added to the list of scheduled drugs over the objec-
tions of the American Medical Association, FDA and the DEA. Thus,
Part III identifies how each drug was initially understood as being in
need of regulation and addresses the role of race and social class in the
movement of drugs into and out of the criminal regulatory regime. Part
IV, the final section of this Article, outlines the broader implications of
my theory and suggests areas for future inquiry.
I. DRUG REGULATORY MECHANISMS & SCHOLARSHIP
A. Overview of Drug Regulatory Mechanisms
Broadly defined, a drug is a substance other than food that, when
absorbed into the body of a living organism, affects the structure or func-
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tion of the body. 10 Virtually every society and culture in human history
has embraced the use of some sort of drug and developed norms gov-
erning its consumption.11 Only the early inhabitants of arctic climates
lacked indigenous drugs due to the inhospitable nature of their environ-
ment, which did not allow for the cultivation of such substances.1 2 Once
introduced by outside groups, however, drugs were readily adopted into
these cultures. 13 The types of substances consumed and their effects are
as varied as the cultures that use them. 14 Some drugs are taken to cure or
ameliorate the symptoms of a disease or illness, while others, such as
opiates and cannabis, are taken to relieve pain. 15 There are drugs like
coffee, tobacco, coca, tea, and khat that are taken for their stimulant ef-
fects. 16 Still other drugs induce relaxation, provoke aggression, remove
inhibitions, relieve tension, arouse or suppress the libido, or alter one's
temporal experience. 17 While some drugs are taken to help people cope
with depression, hardship or tragedy, others are consumed simply as rec-
reational activity to ameliorate the monotony of daily life.1 8 Psycho-
tropic plants-organic substances that have the capacity to change the
way one experiences time and space-are almost universally the most
heavily regulated.19
In order to address the prevalence of drug use, government-at the
federal, state and local levels-promulgates and enforces laws to control
production, consumption, and sale. Thus, today, individuals of all in-
come levels, from rural, suburban, and urban areas, and from virtually
every age, racial, and ethnic group are subject to a dizzying array of drug
10 See Merriam Webster OnLine, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/drug (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (defining "drug" as "a substance other than food intended to affect the
structure or function of the body"). Most definitions of the term "drug" are imperfect. The
Webster's dictionary, for example, also defines a drug as "a substance used for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease" and as "an illegal substance that causes
addiction, habituation or a marked change in consciousness." Id. The Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act defines drugs as "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man .... 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994). Some drugs, however, could
be considered food, such as mushrooms, and recently Cheerios cereal was threatened with
classification as a drug by the FDA because the box label claimed that it helps to reduce
cholesterol levels and the risk of coronary disease. See William La Jeunesse, FDA Takes
Cheerios to Task for Boastful Labels, FoxNEws.coM, June 19, 2009, http://www.foxnews.
com/politics/2009/06/19/fda-takes-cheerios-task-boastful-labels/.
11 See MICHAEL POLLAN, BOTANY OF DESIRE: A PLANT'S EYE VIEW OF THE WORLD 139
(2001).
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 140.
15 See id. at 142.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See RESULTS FROM aHE 2007 NAT'L SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, supra note
1; see generally MOSHER & AINS, supra note 1;
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laws and regulations. 20 These drug control measures differ in many criti-
cal respects, as do their social and demographic effects; from the highly
touted "war on drugs" and the increased policing of tobacco use in public
spaces, to regulations that have allowed for the unprecedented prolifera-
tion of prescription drugs.21
The state justifies these laws as efforts to protect personal and pub-
lic health, and to curb the social disorganization that may result from
unregulated drug use.22 The specific aims and regulatory mechanisms
used by the policy-making bodies that are granted jurisdiction over drug
use differ sharply; from the lofty stated goals of the FDA to the punitive
powers of the DEA.23 For example, one regulatory mechanism is drug
scheduling. 24 Pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act, the DEA and
FDA administer five categories or "schedules" established to classify
controlled substances according to their potential for abuse, therapeutic
value, and possible addictiveness. 25 Schedule I is the most restrictive
classification and includes drugs such as heroin, LSD, and marijuana;
while Schedule V is the least restrictive and includes codeine, a com-
monly prescribed painkiller. 26 The drug regulations enacted according to
these schedules are enforced by the DEA.27
Another mechanism for drug control is the FDA drug approval pro-
cess, which involves drug research, testing, and clinical trials undertaken
by scientists, 28 including academic researchers who often work in con-
cert with the pharmaceutical companies that will ultimately manufacture
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See MOSHER & AKINs, supra note 1, at 203-37.
23 See id.
24 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
25 See id. at §§ 801-971. Enforcement of the CSA is the responsibility of the Drug
Enforcement Administration. Id. The FDA is charged with determining safe and effective
medical use of drugs, and the National Institute of Drug Abuse has the authority to conduct
scientific research. Id.
26 See id. § 812. Schedule I drugs are those that: (1) have a high potential for abuse, (2)
have no therapeutic value, and (3) are not safe for medical use. Schedule II drugs are those
that have a high potential for abuse, which may lead to severe psychological or physical de-
pendence, but that have a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions. Schedule II
includes drugs such as cocaine, morphine and amphetamines. Schedule III drugs include ana-
bolic steroids and marinol, while Schedule IV drugs include long-acting barbiturates, such as
Phenobarbital and certain antidiarrheal drugs, including difenoxin. Finally, Schedule V drugs
have a currently accepted medical use and the lowest potential for abuse relative to drugs in
the other schedules. These drugs are typically available only for medicinal purposes, such as
cough suppressants containing small amounts of codeine. See id.
27 See id. § 878. See also DEA Mission Statement, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (stating that "the DEA's primary responsibili-
ties include ... [e]nforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act").
28 The FDA has been charged with regulating pharmaceuticals since 1938. See Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994 & Supp. 111 1998).
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and market the drug.29 Patent and intellectual property laws create finan-
cial incentives for innovation.
30
Other regulatory mechanisms are: state criminal laws and penalties;
production subsidies that allow government to encourage the cultivation
of certain drugs; regulation that occurs at the point of sale, such as age
restrictions on the sale of alcohol and nicotine; taxation that allows the
government to discourage, or levy a cost on, certain types of drug use;
and the dictates of private associations as with anabolic steroids. 3' An
additional regulatory mechanism is litigation, which has increasingly be-
come a dominant means by which drug use, production, and distribution
are regulated, particularly when policy-makers are unwilling or unable to
act legislatively. 32 Finally, there is the option to not regulate, thereby
leaving the issue to be resolved by market forces.
B. Overview of Drug Regulation Scholarship
In the United States, drug regulation scholars have divided drugs
roughly into three categories: illegal, over-the-counter, and prescription
drugs. 33 This categorization is ostensibly based on the pharmacological
effects of the drug. The rationale behind labeling one drug "medicine"
and another "recreational," however, is not always so clear. This is be-
cause the inherent qualities of a particular drug or the effects it produces
do not appear to determine whether the drug will be legalized or
criminalized, or whether the user will be stigmatized, rehabilitated,
marginalized, or left alone. 3
4
As puzzling as this phenomenon is, perhaps equally puzzling from
an academic perspective, is that very few scholars have, in fact, tried to
figure out this conundrum. Although much has been written on the topic
of drug regulation, the overwhelming majority of this work focuses on
either illicit or licit drugs. Many scholars have produced work examin-
29 See Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, 21
C.F.R. §§ 1-1299 (2003).
30 See Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific Integrity to the
Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 654 (2004); A.K. Rai, Regulat-
ing Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 77, 93-94 (1999).
31 See generally MOSHER & AaINS, supra note 1.
32 See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that the
federal requirement that the surgeon general's warning appear on cigarette containers does not
preempt state law damage claims against cigarette manufacturers); ROBERT KAGAN, ADVER-
SARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERIcAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (arguing that the "American way of
law" uniquely privileges litigation as the chief method of policy making, implementation, and
dispute resolution).
33 See MARGARET P. BATTIN, ET AL., DRUGS & JUSTICE: SEEKING A CONSISTENT, COHER-
ENT, COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 8-9 (2008).
34 See discussion infra Part I.
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ing the inconsistencies in the regulation of criminalized drugs,35 while
others have focused on tobacco36 and pharmaceutical drug regulation.37
This scholarship can be divided into three overlapping approaches: his-
torical analysis, normative policy prescriptions, and critical analysis.
The explanatory power of this work is limited by the fact that these
scholars examine drugs in a category-specific way. In recent years, a
few scholars have studied the regulatory inconsistencies that exist across
35 See generally RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD H, THE MARIHUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974) (explor-
ing the inconsistent regulation of marihuana throughout the twentieth century); CRACK IN
AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds.,
1997) (analyzing the negative media treatment and policing of crack, which aided in creating
an inflated sense of the crack epidemic); DRUGS IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(David F. Musto ed., 2002) (examining the inconsistent treatment of various drugs throughout
American history); TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS AND,
MORAL JUDGMENT passim (1970) (focusing on how society forms moral opinions about and
judgments of drugs and drug users); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR
HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES passim (2001) (comparing con-
temporary regulation and use of various drugs in an effort to foster reformulation of drug
policing policies); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CON-
TROL (3d. ed. 1997); DAVID MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL:
POLITICS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981
(2002) (describing how political leaders grappled with the surges in drug use that occurred
throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s); JOSEPH F. SPILLANE, COCAINE: FROM MEDICAL
MARVEL TO MODERN MENACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1884-1920 (2000) (examining the path
of cocaine from a medically legitimate drug to a stigmatized and regulated illegal substance);
Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowl-
edge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV.
971 (1970) (analyzing the inconsistent legal treatment of marijuana in the United States).
36 See generally Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 49, 49-68 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993) (addressing the seemingly contradictory attitudes towards smoking
throughout the history of the United States); PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN,
TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT (1997) (case studies of the
effectiveness of state tobacco regulation); Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning
Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CUL-
TURE 69, 69-94 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (examining effect of
regulation on social norms and attitudes towards smoking); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO
ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UN-
ABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORIS (1996) (study of the move to regulation and the efforts
of the tobacco industry to overcome regulations); TARA PARKER-POPE, CIGARETTES: ANATOMY
OF AN INDUSTRY FROM SEED To SMOKE (2001) (discussing the tobacco industry's ability to
overcome tobacco regulations); JACOB SULLUM, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: THE ANTI-SMOKING
CRUSADE AND THE TYRANNY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1998); SUSAN WAGNER, CIGARETTE COUN-
TRY: TOBACCO IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS (1971); ELIZABETH M. WHELAN, A
SMOKING GUN: How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH MURDER (1984).
37 See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES (2004)
(examining how drug companies use marketing campaigns to alter public perception and
thwart regulation); DAVID HEALY, LET THEM EAT PROZAC: THE UNHEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPRESSION (2004) (examining the develop-
ment of pharmaceutical regulation); JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FED-
ERAL FOOD AND DRUG ACT OF 1906 (1989) [hereinafter YOUNG, PURE FOOD] (discussing the
pure food movement and regulation of emerging technologies).
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categories of licit and illicit drugs; however, this scholarship is more de-
scriptive than theoretical, in that it notes the inconsistencies without
seeking to fully explain them.38 Indeed, neither this nor any of the other
scholarship in this body of work on the regulation of drugs engages the
fundamental questions motivating this Article: how regulators are able to
treat drugs differently irrespective of the dangers they may pose and in-
dependent of their health effects, and the processes followed to achieve
this phenomenon.
This Article can also be situated within two additional, important
bodies of legal scholarship: law and social norms, and law and social
meaning. Social norms scholarship emerged from the social sciences
and was embraced by legal scholars-particularly Law and Economics
theorists and criminal law scholars-who focused on norms of conduct
in the analysis of legal issues. 39 The central tenets of the law and norms
school, according to Robert Weisberg, are as follows:
[S]ocial actors are governed less by formal laws than by
patterns of behavior which have accrued normative, if
not obligatory force; that norms often govern in a man-
ner indifferent to legal rules, sometimes helping or im-
peding the enforcement of rules; that norms are
immanent with social meaning which lawmakers would
do well to heed, and which they can usefully exploit; and
that people are susceptible to the conforming force of
38 See generally BATrIN, ET AL., supra note 33; CYNTHIA KUHN, ET AL. BUZZED: THE
STRAIGHT FACTS ABOUT THE MOST USED AND ABUSED DRUGS FROM ALCOHOL TO ECSTASY
(2003) (describing mental and physical effects of most drugs and the current status of drug
regulation); Robert MacCoun, et al., Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes, 15 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 330 (1996) (examining different regulatory regimes and their relative
costs).
39 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SET-
TLE DISPUTES (1991) (examining how order is achieved without law through social norms);
ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRuMs (2000) (analyzing ways in which the law and social
norms interact); Katherine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REv. 663 (1999)
(analyzing how social norms affect the stigmatization and punishment of rapists); Robert
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86
VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000) (discussing how states can use social norms to influence citizens to
follow the law); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135 (1996)
(analyzing social norms and voting); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar
Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365
(1999) (exploring shaming punishments); Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 340-46 (1997-1998); Symposium, The Legal
Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2002) (exploring the development of social
norms and the interplay between legality and social norms); Symposium, Norms and Corpo-
rate Law, 149 U. PA L. REV. 1607 (2001) (examining the role of social norms in the corporate
law context).
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charismatic individuals or majoritarian patterns of
behavior.40
Scholarship in the field of law and social meaning is both descrip-
tive and prescriptive, and analyzes the construction of social meaning as
a way of illuminating the salience and/or costs of particular behaviors in
a given social context.41 Those who write in this field address how so-
cial meaning is created and deployed by both governments and other
actors to advance individual and collective ends.42
The distinction between these two fields of legal analysis, as Law-
rence Lessig explains, is that "[niorm talk accounts for behavior; it does
not discipline itself to account for context."' 43 "Meaning talk," on the
other hand, focuses "on the relation of behavior to context and the differ-
ences that relation raises." 44 Thus, by examining the ways in which gov-
ernment and others work to create social meaning, scholars in this field
seek to add depth to norms analysis.45 Both law and norms, and law and
meaning analyses have been used to explain numerous legally significant
behaviors, 46 which makes it all the more surprising that none of the
40 Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholar-
ship, 93 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 468-69 (2003).
41 See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998);
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 passim
(1997) (examining the cost of upholding social norns); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (exploring why society prefers imprisonment
to alternative sanctions). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, supra
note 8; Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2000); Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996);
Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537 (1998).
42 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 957 ("Meanings are used by collectives as well as by
individuals, and most importantly for what follows, they are used by one kind of collective in
particular-government. Governments trade on standing social meaning to advance state
ends. If the nation suffers under a health craze, the government can use 'healthy styles of life'
as arguments to fight drug usage. If the nation worships, then the government can use 'family
values' to exclude homosexuals from social life. If a nation is trying to build national identity,
then (tragically) it can use the constructed meaning of race and blood to carve up a nation.").
43 Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181, 2183
(1996).
44 See id. at 2183, 2185 ("Meaning talk reveals something more about the contours to the
costs of the different behaviors; it imports a language that can understand discontinuities in the
valuation of similar behavior.").
45 See Lessig, supra note 8, at 948. See also Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,
and Deterrence, supra note 41, at 394 ("Laws shape individuals' perceptions of each other's
beliefs and intentions in a variety of ways. The types of conduct that a community criminally
punishes, as well as the manner and severity of the punishment it imposes, express shared
valuations. Laws that regulate social norms determine the background against which private
behavior conveys information about citizen's beliefs and intentions. These social meaning
effects help determine whether social influence points toward or away from criminality.").
46 See generally Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA L. REv. 1607
(2001) (highlighting the value of "norm governance" in corporate law); Symposium, Social
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scholars in either field have engaged the critical questions posed in this
Article. 47
By investigating the role of social norms and meaning in the gov-
ernance of a cross-section of drugs subject to diverse regulatory mecha-
nisms-such as pharmaceutical, illicit, and over-the-counter drugs-this
Article more clearly illuminates the subtle nuances of drug regulation
and seeks to increase the analytical depth of academic and legal scholar-
ship on drugs. The existing literature has not offered much insight into
the confounding puzzle of why drugs are regulated as they are, and pro-
vides little guidance-whether descriptive, analytical, or normative-on
how to move forward in this under-theorized area of academic and legal
inquiry. This Article wades into this significant breach and examines an
area of inquiry that has been left largely unexplored.
II. THE REGULATORY REGIMEINORMS MODEL
Before the government may regulate drugs or engage in any signifi-
cant intervention into people's private affairs, it needs legitimating cir-
cumstances or a stated justification, such as a show of harm or a
substantial state interest.48 While the specific types of "threats" that drug
regulators deem in need of remedy have differed over time, the most
often stated justifications for intervention are harm to self, harm to
others, and moral and ethical concerns. 49
Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998)
(suggesting that heightened attention to social norms will signal a change in the field of law
and economics).
47 Among legal scholars, Dan Kahan stands alone in having devised a theoretical model
of norms and legal change that pays glancing attention to drugs. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 631-33
(2000). Kahan argues that when lawmakers attempt to change contested social behaviors, such
as smoking or illicit drug use, with a "hard shove," these lawmakers run the risk of triggering a
self-defeating backlash. See id. If, however, lawmakers apply an incrementally escalating
"gentle nudge," they can more effectively eliminate the contested behavior by shifting under-
standing of the behavior from general ambivalence to public condemnation, which then allows
for more punitive legal action. See id. at 608. My Regulatory Regime/Norms model indicates,
however, that it is not the incremental push alone that determines whether the behavior will
one day be subject to regulation or harsh penal sanction, but rather, how that behavior is
framed or characterized. It is the framing of the conduct in a way that is consistent with the
specific norms of a regulatory regime that changes popular attitudes toward the contested be-
havior and allows for regulatory change, not simply the incremental nature of the regulatory
enterprise. This norms-matching process drives drug regulatory decision-making to the exclu-
sion of other factors, including empirical evidence.
48 See Comment, Laetrile: Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of
Ineffective Drugs, 127 U. PA. L. Rav. 233, 265 (noting that "[a] major governmental interest
implicit in the establishment of the federal drug laws is the protection of both the general
public and specific individuals from dangerous drugs").
49 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public's Right to Health: When Patient Rights
Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1335, 1348-49 (noting that "criminal prohibi-
tions on ... illicit drugs[ ] paternalistically aim to protect individuals from engaging in unsafe
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These broad justifications tend to revolve around a few common
themes, principally: ensuring the safety and efficacy of commercially
manufactured pharmaceutical drugs; protecting children from the direct
or indirect effects of drug use; fighting addiction; and reducing the sec-
ondary effects of drug use, such as criminal activity. 50 The underlying
rationale is that the government can properly intervene when (1) vulnera-
ble populations that may be limited in their ability to make independent,
rational decisions about drug use are at risk, such as children; (2) individ-
uals infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others, such as those who
engage in secondary criminal activity, etc.; or (3) drug activity conflicts
with state expectations about what constitutes appropriate, moral, respon-
sible, and virtuous behavior.5' Thus, the state must demonstrate whom it
is protecting and why. Once the rationale has been stated, the issue then
becomes which regulatory regime is the most suitable: the criminal re-
gime, the public health regime, or the market regulatory regime.
Drug regulatory regimes, as operative today, did not exist a century
ago.5 2 They have taken shape over time and expanded their sphere of
influence into areas of social life previously deemed "private" or beyond
the proper reach of government.53 In so doing, they developed specific
areas of specialization that enabled them to establish their legitimacy and
command authority. 54 Regulatory regimes have evolved into increas-
conduct, express moral condemnation, and aim to reduce 'neighborhood effects."'). See also
Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 11
(2009) (arguing that other harms stem from the existence of drug laws).
50 See BATrIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 32-36.
51 See id. at 141-50; CLAYTON J. MOSHER & Sco-r" AKINS, DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY:
THE CONTROL OF CONSCIOUSNESS ALTERATION 6-22 (2007) (explaining the wide-ranging cri-
tiques that regulators levied against marijuana users during the twentieth century).
52 For an example of the way regulatory regimes evolve through an examination of the
development of the public health regime in relation to passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act
of 1906, see YOUNG, PURE FOOD, supra note 37.
53 See BAThrN ET AL., supra note 33, at 29-30.
54 See CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGU-
LATION REGIMES 9-11 (2001). The Regulatory regime concept emerged from the field of risk
regulation, and was developed as an analytical construct to examine, compare and describe the
different ways in which governing authorities manage risk. See id. Hood et al. adopt the risk
regulatory regime as a framework for demonstrating the myriad ways risk regulation changes
over time and differs across various domains. See id. In their analysis, the risk regulatory
regime is a relatively bounded system of interacting parts that has some degree of continuity
over time, and that can be examined at both broad and narrow levels of specificity. See id.
The regulatory regime concept has been used since at least the 1970s by scholars from many
disciplines. Economists have used it to compare policy instruments. See Stephen L. Elkin,
Regulation and Regime: A Comparative Analysis, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 49, 52-54 (1986). Legal
scholars use the regime to examine different arrangements of rules, procedures and practices
related to such topics as human rights or environmental protection. See Daniel L. Crane,
Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1162-63 (2008) (arguing that technocratic
solutions to issues like environmental protection lead to overprotection against risk in adminis-
trative states); Daniel Gilman, Oy Canada! Trade's Non-Solution to "The Problem of U.S.
Drug Prices", 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 247, 264-70 (2006) (arguing that loosening drug regula-
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ingly differentiated and autonomous systems. 55 Each is comprised of
specific actors and institutions. And each regime is largely distinct from
the others and maintains its own logic, training, and language. 56 Each is
bound by its own rules, values, ethics, and culture; employs different
regulatory methods; relies upon distinct forms of knowledge; embodies
unique preferences, expectations, and commitments; and serves different,
although occasionally overlapping, political, commercial, and govern-
mental interests. 57  Each produces discourses that articulate regime
norms, philosophies, and agendas. These discourses are deployed strate-
gically and persuasively by the actors who administer and enforce the
different regimes. For example, phrases such as "war on drugs," "harm
reduction," and "personal responsibility" are not only constitutive parts
of the criminal, public health, and market regimes, respectively, but they
also work to influence public perceptions of drugs and drug users. The
operation of this complex internal matrix allows each regime to erect its
own institutional barriers. Thus, while drug regulatory regimes remain
sensitive to outside norms and pressures, each regime exhibits a self-
referential closure that enables it to reproduce itself as a distinct entity.58
Drug regulatory regimes are enforceable legal structures of regula-
tion. They create and reinforce distinct belief systems, governing princi-
ples, ideologies, or what Lessig calls "orthodoxy," with respect to the
tions as between America and Canada would incur undue transaction costs); Th6rse Murphy
& Noel Whitty, Risk and Human Rights in U.K. Prison Governance, 47 J. BRrr. CRIMINOLOGY
796, 806 (2007) (arguing that risk regulation should be more internationally focused, as human
rights issues span across jurisdictional boundaries). Cf. MacCoun, et al., supra note 38, at
330-31 (normative objectives of drug enforcement policies should be weighed against the
costs of implementing those objectives). Public policy theorists and political scientists use the
regime to examine the nature of governance, relations between actors and their use of re-
sources. See KErTH DOWDING, POWER 82-88 (1996) (using regime theory to explain the "sys-
tematic luck" of capitalists in light of the constrained options of other social groups); STEPHEN
D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 235-39 (1983) (tying regime strength to international
abilities and using the model to explain how American export/import rates fluctuate relative to
the country's production of goods); Mark A. Kleiman & Aaron J. Saige, Drug Legalization:
The Importance of Asking the Right Question, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 527, 565 (1990) (address-
ing drug control regimes with respect to such areas as legalization, criminalization, and regu-
lated commerce). This is but a sampling of the numerous academic and practical uses of the
regulatory regime analytic.
55 See HOOD Er AL., supra note 54, at 173-74.
56 See id. at 10-12 (noting that scholars in a number of different fields use the regulatory
regime concept as an effective means of characterizing various forms of governing bodies as
clusters of norms, rules, tactics, and procedures).
57 One example of this overlap is drug courts. Although these courts employ both crimi-
nal law and public health mechanisms, their underlying premise is primarily criminal. See
JAMEs A. INCIARDI ET AL., DRUG CONTROL AND THE COURTS 32 (1996). As a result, despite
some slippage and overlap, these regimes are generally distinct entities. Id. at 85-88.
58 See BATnN ET AL., supra note 33, at 7-9.
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drugs placed within their sphere of influence. 59 These governing princi-
ples give each regime meaning, and operate as rules of the regime or
instructions for how the regime organizes behavior and expectations
about drugs. 60 The governing principles that structure each regime are
assumption of risk and rational choice principles in the market regime,
disclosure principles in the public health regime, and moral principles in
the criminal regulatory regime.
A. The Market Regulatory Regime
Regulation through the market regime is the default position in a
liberal, capitalist democratic society. 61 Within this regime, drugs are un-
derstood as consumer goods that are normalized through advertising and
the respectability of their distribution through over-the-counter sales.
The lack of stigma associated with drugs regulated through this regime
allows the users to be deemed rational consumers who have assumed the
risks attendant to their drug use. This risk allocation, according to the
market ethos, promotes efficiency by ensuring that the costs and burdens
of drug use are borne by those best able to take appropriate measures to
reduce injury. Tobacco, alcohol, and caffeine are examples of drugs
governed primarily by the market regime.
Corporations are the primary players in this regime. Drug compa-
nies (e.g., tobacco, alcohol, etc.) are driven by the self-reinforcing need
to maximize profits by increasing their share of the market of potential
drug users through the creation of consumers and the generation of
sales.62 Drug companies have become a formidable economic and politi-
cal force, capable of thwarting most significant governmental attempts to
59 See Lessig, supra note 8, at 945-48. Lessig explains that the government "prescribes"
orthodoxy when citizens ignore governmental construction of the social meanings that sur-
round them. Id. at 946-47. In Lessig's view, social meanings "are what is orthodox. They
constitute what is authority for a particular society, or particular culture." Id.
60 Lessig makes three assertions about social meanings. First, Lessig asserts the exis-
tence of social meanings; second, that social meanings are used by both individuals and groups
to advance goals; and third, that the force of social meanings "hangs upon their resting upon a
certain uncontested, or taken-for-granted, background of thought or expectation-alterna-
tively, that though constructed, their force depends upon them not seeming constructed." Id. at
951.
61 See Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the Burden When Manufacturers
Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 1073
(1997) (noting that "[niow, consumers themselves are targeted by the pharmaceutical industry
in both the print and electronic media with advertisements about everything from hair loss
products and wrinkle creams to birth-control pills.").
62 See Julie M. Donohue, et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pre-
scription Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 7, 673, 673-674 (2007). See also Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,
112 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1502 (1999) (describing a "coordinated ... approach" by tobacco
companies "to expanding the industry's reach and profitability.").
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intervene in the market regime to regulate drugs. 63 This is due largely to
the fact that the governing principles that structure the market regime
reflect the orthodoxy of liberalism: the prevailing social arrangement of
contemporary U.S. society. 64 These corporate actors, therefore, work
hard to frame their drugs in ways that resonate with the dominant princi-
ples of the market regime: rational choice and assumption of risk. This is
accomplished primarily through advertising, which normalizes drug con-
sumption by shaping popular understanding of certain drug use as nor-
mal, healthy, pleasurable and, indeed, necessary. 65 Advertising is so
critical to the operation of the market regulatory regime that corporations
spend billions of dollars to carefully engineer advertisements for strategi-
cally targeted populations of potential consumers.66
The so-called "free market," however, is by no means unfettered by
government interference. 67 Rather than reflecting a Hobbesian or natural
state, the market is instead a socially conditioned and legally structured
entity. It is the laissez-faire state that enforces liberal prescription in the
market regime as government plays a much smaller role in this regime
than in the others. 68 Thus, many drugs in the market regime are subject
to some, albeit minimal, regulation (e.g., alcohol and tobacco as opposed
to caffeine or salvia divinorum, a powerful yet unregulated halluci-
nogen). Because the market regime is the original position in a liberal,
63 See MELODY PETERSEN, OUR DAILY MEDS 9-11 (2008).
64 See Allan C. Hutchinson, 73 CAL. L. REV. 755, 760 (1985) (explaining that "[i]n all its
forms, liberalism begins and ends with the individual," and "maintains that the self-interested
actions of individuals represent the most appropriate and effective principled basis for soci-
ety's economic and political organization).
65 See generally DAVID HEALY, LET THEM EAT PROZAC: THE UNHEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPRESSION (2004); YOUNG, PURE FOOD,
supra note 37; MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES (2004).
66 See ANGELL, supra note 37, at 136 (noting that drug companies masquerade marketing
as education about their drugs, which is directed mostly at doctors); PETERSEN, supra note 63,
at 140-45 (explaining that drug companies target remedies for chronic illnesses as "blockbus-
ter drugs" that bring in high revenue); Josef Winkler, You Wanted the Best, You Got the Best!
The Current Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertisement Dilemma, 26 BIOTECH. L.
REP. 331, 332-333 (2007) (discussing the billions of dollars spent for direct-to-consumer
advertising).
67 See Robert Hessen, Capitalism, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., http://www.econlib.
org/library/Enc/Capitalism.html ("A fully free economy ... never has existed, but governmen-
tal authority over economic activity has sharply increased since the eighteenth century, and
especially since the Great Depression.").
68 See Dennis Chong et al., Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in
the United States, 13 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 401, 401, 404, 434 (1983) (contrasting interpretations
of capitalism along with principles of democracy, ranging from welfare state capitalism to
laissez-faire capitalism. The welfare-state pattern is high on democracy and low on capitalism,
whereas the liberal pattern is high on both capitalism and democracy. Conservatives favor a
pattern of high capitalism and low democracy.).
2010]
708 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:691
capitalist, democratic society, regulators must justify their decisions to
intervene in this regime. 69
B. The Public Health Regulatory Regime
The public health regulatory regime governs through science, which
is more than just a metaphor; it is, rather, a specific and penetrating form
of governance.70 From the FDA and National Institute on Drug Abuse to
the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the National Institutes of
Health, the missions of public health institutions and agencies with re-
spect to drug regulation are vast, encompassing, broad-based efforts to:
evaluate population health; prevent addiction, reduce the harms attendant
to drug use (e.g., diseases passed through shared needles, etc.), assure the
safety and efficacy of commercially manufactured drugs, evaluate the
quality of and ensure access to drug treatment services, oversee and fi-
nance research, and encourage healthy behavior. 71
The institutes and actors that constitute the public health regime op-
erate under principles of disclosure.72 These principles have emerged
from the creation, evaluation, and dissemination of scientific knowledge,
which requires an open, collaborative process, where transparency is par-
amount, and data is shared freely among those engaged in its research
and evaluation. Disclosure, therefore, is essential to the fundamental au-
thority of regulatory decision-making in the public health regime as this
authority is based entirely upon the independence, accuracy, and integ-
rity of the procedures and protocols used to arrive at medical, scientific,
and public health policy conclusions. 73
Disclosure principles also enable the FDA to effectively evaluate
drug safety and efficacy during all phases of the drug approval process
69 See discussion infra Part md.
70 See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHics: A READER 226-63 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed.,
2003) (arguing that where capital markets neglect public health, the government should be
allowed to regulate).
71 See GLEN HANSON Er AL., DRUGS AND SoCIETY 95-98 (2005); LAWRENCE 0. GosT.,
PUBLIC HEALTh LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTAINT, 44-46 (2003); U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Organizational Chart, http://www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart/index.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, About the FDA Organization
Charts, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OrganizationCharts/default.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (showing that Department of Health and Human Services includes the
following agencies: Food and Drug Administration, Centers for Disease Control, National In-
stitutes of Health, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration. Within the
FDA, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research division reviews and monitors medical
drug safety. The Center for Veterinary Medicine assumes the role for animals. Biologics
Evaluations and Research governs vaccine safety).
72 See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and Ameri-
can Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1773-74 (1999) (noting that failure to incorporate
direct government action in health care regulation has given rise to disclosure requirements).
73 See id.
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including requiring commercial drug manufacturers to release research
data on drug properties and possible negative side effects, in order to
ensure that drugs function according to manufacturers' claims. 7 4 The
disclosure of such health data from drug makers is essential to enabling
medical practitioners to make informed professional decisions affecting
patient care and for consumers to select the appropriate drugs to address
their health needs.
C. The Criminal Regulatory Regime
The criminal drug regulatory regime focuses on the investigation,
interdiction, arrest, prosecution and incarceration of those involved with
illicit drug consumption, distribution, trafficking, and manufacture with
the goal of punishing those who have transgressed the boundaries of civi-
lized society. In the criminal regulatory regime, drug regulation is not
only a practice of government, a means of shaping conduct, and an exer-
cise of power and authority; it is also an aspirational endeavor to the
extent that it seeks to forge notions of whom and what we should be
individually and collectively. Thus, for a drug to be moved from the
market or public health regimes to the criminal regulatory regime, it must
74 See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
579-80 (2000). See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95
(1994 & Supp. 1 1998); JAMES ROBERT NIELSON, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW (2d ed.
1992) (noting that the FDA drug approval process begins when a manufacturer files an Investi-
gational New Drug Application (INDA) with the FDA, which includes "pre-clinical studies,"
such as chemical analyses, animal studies, and proposed methods for human trials. The FDA
then determines whether the drug can be used safely in human studies, whether protocols
adequately protect human subjects, and whether the studies are designed to effectively evalu-
ate the drug's safety and efficacy. Human clinical trials typically occur in three phases, which
usually takes four to six years to complete. Phase I is conducted on a relatively small number
(50-100) of healthy subjects, in order to determine the safety and possible side effects of the
drug. Phase 1I studies tend to be larger (50-200 people), randomized, controlled studies on
participants who have the disease or condition the drug is meant to treat. Phase III trials
include hundreds and possibly thousands of subjects, and, are aimed at providing additional
information on safety and efficacy, necessary to evaluate the drug's overall risk-benefit value.
Upon completion of these phases, the drug manufacturer can submit a New Drug Application
(NDA) to the FDA, which mandates the disclosure of detailed safety and efficacy data and
analysis. The NDA must include: dosage instructions for use, known precautions, warnings,
contraindications, and proposed labeling for the new drug that describes the conditions it is
intended to treat. Generally, only data collected by one out of ten manufacturers culminates in
an NDA filing. In making its evaluation, the FDA conducts a risk-benefit analysis, examining
the severity of the health condition targeted and the availability of alternate therapies. Thus, if
the drug treats a life-threatening ailment or is the only drug on the market for a particular
condition, the chance of its approval increases substantially. This creates an incentive for
researchers to create beneficial and often life-saving medications. It also encourages and expe-
dites the drug approval process so that those in dire need can get their drugs quickly. The
FDA evaluation and approval process can take from two to three years and the entire process
can last from seven to thirteen years. All prescription drugs are controlled through this regula-
tory system, with the exception of drugs used by pediatric patients, which have historically
undergone little regulation).
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do more than pose an ostensible threat to public health or safety; use of
the drug must be perceived to violate fundamental moral values.
75
The criminal regime creates and reinforces principles derived from
moral prescriptives. 76 In addition to its regulatory and juridical func-
tions, the criminal regulatory regime creates and reaffirms the moral
principles of the collective consciousness writ large.77 Understood as
such, this type of regulation is preconditioned upon notions of morality;
both in terms of how regulators influence values, behavior, and beliefs
with regard to that which constitutes good, just, appropriate, and respon-
sible behavior; as well as how individuals perceive and respond to
government.
D. Norms and the Regulatory Regime/Norms Model
The public and private entities that operate in each drug regulatory
regime produce and reinforce social norms. Social norms are customary
rules of behavior that people in a society or group follow for reasons
other than fear of legal sanction.78 Although norms are abstract to the
extent that they can exist anywhere, they must be contextualized in order
to convey meaning and be understood. In my model, the regimes pro-
vide that context.79 The norms that emerge from each regulatory regime
are manifestations of the regime's governing principles: rational choice
and assumption of risk, disclosure, or moral norms.80 These norms make
sense in relation to the particular regulatory regime they reflect and em-
body regime principles as taken-for-granted and uncontested in mean-
ing.81 Thus, the power of these norms is that within the appropriate
context, the meanings they convey seem natural and not constructed. 82
According to the Regulatory Regime/Norms model, the project of
regulating drugs is about allocating specific meaning to drug use in rela-
tion to the norms of a particular regime in order to shape public under-
standing of the drug in a way that allows for state intervention. As I will
75 See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
76 See Weisberg, supra note 40, at 468.
77 See Duster, supra note 35, at 219-20.
78 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NoRMs
AND THE LAW 15 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (noting that although there is considerable
disagreement in relevant legal literature about the definition of norms and how they operate,
most scholars define norms as established or customary rules of behavior that people in a
society or group follow for reasons other than fear of legal sanction). See also McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, supra note 39, at 340 ("[Norms are] informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of
duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.").
79 See Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, supra note 43, at 2183-84.
80 See Weisberg, supra note 40, at 468-69.
81 See Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 8, at 951.
82 See id.
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demonstrate in the following section, how a drug will be regulated is
determined by the victor in a contest to characterize the drug in a way
that is consistent with the norms of a specific regulatory regime. If the
characterization is persuasive, then the drug may be placed in the regime
regardless of whether the veracity of the victor's claims can be verified
scientifically. Therefore, if the corporate entities, private reformers, and
government actors who engage in drug designation decisions are able to
successfully shape public perception of a drug in a way that matches the
norms of a particular regime, then the drug may be regulated in that
regime, regardless of whether the drug presents a threat to safety or
health and even if the regime placement decision is not supported by
scientific or medical evidence regarding the drug's pharmacological
properties. Once the drug has been placed, the regime will legitimate the
regulators' characterization of the drug.
The drug will stay in the regime until its characterization no longer
resonates with the norms of the regime. Hence, once popular under-
standing of a drug is no longer consistent with the norms of the regime,
the drug can be moved out of that regime and into another. However, if
a criminalized drug has also been linked to a racialized or socially
maligned group, it will be significantly more difficult for the drug to one
day migrate into another regime. Therefore, even if one is able to suc-
cessfully undermine the morally charged meaning attached to a drug reg-
ulated in the criminal regime, the extent to which the drug is identified
with racial minorities or other marginalized groups will determine
whether the drug will ultimately ever move from the regime.
The following section applies the Regulatory Regime/Norms model
to the regulation of tobacco, marijuana, anabolic steroids and cocaine in
order to demonstrate the model's explanatory force and empirical
grounding.
III. ANIMATING THE MODEL: A TALE OF FOUR DRUGS
A. A Contest of Characterizations: Moving a Drug from One
Regulatory Regime to Another
This section animates the Regulatory Regime/Norms model by il-
lustrating how drugs move among regulatory regimes. Part A applies the
model to the regulation of tobacco, cocaine, marijuana, anabolic steroids,
and passage of the Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906. Part B provides a
more detailed look at the model by closely analyzing the regulation of
tobacco. Part C examines the movement of drugs out of the criminal
regime and addresses the roles of race and class in this process.
If a group is able to persuasively frame a drug in a way that is
consonant with the norms of the regime that suits the group's prefer-
ences, then the drug may be placed in that regime, regardless of whether
2010]
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the designation decision is supported by empirical evidence grounded in
science or medicine. For example, tobacco was regulated for over a cen-
tury in the market regime because its manufacturers successfully used
advertising to painstakingly shape the meaning of smoking to reflect the
prevailing norms of the market regulatory regime: rational choice and
assumption of risk.83
Despite tobacco's undisputed negative health effects and stagger-
ingly high mortality rate, the tobacco industry has effectively used adver-
tising to portray tobacco consumption as synonymous with freedom,
independence, masculinity, sophistication, and cosmopolitanism. 8 4 This
characterization shaped public opinion and drove public acceptance,
which was reflected back and popularized through positive media repre-
sentations of smokers as young, healthy, and attractive. 85 The tobacco
industry's success in framing the drug in a way that is consistent with
market regime norms has enabled it to not only defeat numerous attempts
to shift tobacco into the public health regime, but has made it the second
most popular recreational drug in the United States after alcohol. 86
In the case of marijuana, by contrast, no corporation bankrolled the
fight to keep the drug in the market regime, where marijuana had been
widely available as a commonly used appetite stimulant, muscle relaxant,
83 See Helmut Wakeham, Why One Smokes (1969), available at http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/tid/pds74eOO (first draft of a memorandum from Vice President of Research and De-
velopment at Philip Morris). See also FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR
1995, PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL CIGARETrE AND ADVERTISING Acr 17 tbl.3D (1997) (show-
ing that in 1993, for example, tobacco companies spent over 6 billion dollars on advertising
and promotion); FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 1996, PURSUANT TO
THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING AcT 18 tbl.3E (1998) (showing that the
tobacco industry spent five billion dollars on advertising and promotion in 1994).
84 See Wakeham, supra note 83 ("'Smoking a cigarette for the beginner is a symbolic
act. The smoker is telling the world, this is the kind of person I am.' Surely, that there are
many variants of the theme, 'I am no longer my mother's child, I'm tough, I am an adventur-
ess, I'm not square.' Whatever the individual intent, the act of smoking remains a symbolic
declaration of personal identity .... As the force from the psychological symbolism subsides,
the pharmacological effect takes over to sustain the habit, augmented by the secondary
gratifications.").
85 See id.
86 See Elizabeth Brown Alphin, Note, Federal Tobacco Regulation: The Failure of the
FDA Jurisdiction over Tobacco and the Possibility of Compromise Through a Congressional
Regulatory Scheme, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 121, 123-24 (2001) (chronicling the history of tobacco
regulation and the responses of the tobacco industry); Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy,
and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REv. 909, 920-21 (1992) (comparing advertising in the alcohol
and tobacco industries); Steven Jonas, The Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the
Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 751, 792 (1990) (providing a population estimate of nonmedical drug use; the highest use
percentage is seen for alcohol, and the second for tobacco); Cynthia S. Duncan, Note, The
Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1701, 1705
(2009) (noting that alcohol and tobacco lead marijuana in recreational drug use).
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analgesic, hypnotic, and anticonvulsant. 87 Instead, marijuana was moved
to the criminal regulatory regime due to the success of a grassroots
movement in the Southwestern United States to frame marijuana use in a
way that resonated with the moral norms of the criminal regime. 88 This
movement, later joined by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and assisted
by the media, successfully labeled marijuana in the public mind as "Mex-
ican opium," a drug that turned Mexican field hands violent and high
school students insane. 89 Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century,
marijuana consumption in southwestern states was limited almost exclu-
sively to the Mexican population, which was perceived by many in the
region as posing an economic threat to the domestic labor force.90
Before long, racist and xenophobic fears about Mexican immigrants, fu-
eled by claims of a causal relationship between marijuana and criminal-
ity, prompted southwestern states with large Mexican populations to
begin passing legislation outlawing the drug. By 1937, forty-six states
had passed such legislation, often with little debate.91
Similarly, cocaine was a popular recreational and therapeutic drug
found in everything from alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, cough suppres-
87 See JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIHUANA: POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 21-22 (1983).
88 See Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legisla-
tion in the United States, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 411, 432 (1999).
89 See id. at 59-71 (noting that tabloid newspapers across the country reported graphic
stories of alleged marijuana-induced madness, violence, sexual deviance, and criminal activity,
typically perpetrated by immigrants intoxicated by the drug). See also LESTER GRINSPOON,
M.D. & JAMES BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 195 (2d ed. 1997) (noting
that the supposed dangers posed by marijuana were even addressed in popular movies, such as
the 1936 film, Reefer Madness, which depicted a killing, suicide, rape, and subsequent descent
into insanity among high school students lured into smoking marijuana).
90 See Auerhahn, supra note 88, at 432. See also JOHN HELMER, DRUGS AND MINORITY
OPPRESSION 55, 75 (1975) ("[Anti-Mexican sentiment rose from the] struggle for a diminish-
ing number of jobs in the unskilled sector .... ); JoHN HELMER & THOMAS VIETORISz, THE
DRUG ABUSE COUNCIL, DRUG USE, THE LABOR MARKET, AND CLASS CONFLICT (1974) ("[A]
theory of the evils of [marijuana], which linked its use and supply to being Mexican, made
hostility toward these people seem slightly more reasonable, and public policy to remove them
that much more acceptable.").
91 See EDWARD M. BRECHER, CONSUMERS UNION, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 413 (1972)
("By 1937, forty-six of the forty-eight states as well as the District of Columbia had laws
against marijuana."). See also BoNNm & WHITEBREAD, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION, supra
note 35, at 51-52 (mapping all anti-Marijuana legislation enacted between 1915-1933: Ala-
bama (1932); Arizona (1931); Arkansas (1923); California (1915); Colorado (1917); Delaware
(1933); Idaho (1927); Illinois (1931); Indiana (1929); Iowa (1929); Kansas (1927); Louisiana
(1914); Maine (1914); Massachusetts (1914); Michigan (1929); Mississippi (1930); Montana
(1927); Nebraska (1927); Nevada (1923); New Mexico (1923); New York (1927); North Da-
kota (1933); Ohio (1927); Oklahoma (1933); Oregon (1923); Pennsylvania (1933); Rhode Is-
land (1918); South Dakota (1931); Texas (1919); Utah (1915); Vermont (1915); and Wyoming
(1929)); Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge, supra note
35, at 1010-20 ("We conclude that the legislative action and judicial approval were essentially
kneejerk responses uninformed by scientific study or public debate and colored instead by
racial bias and sensationalistic myths.").
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sants, baby elixirs and, most famously, Coca-Cola,92 until Southern
whites, during the early twentieth century, successfully characterized co-
caine as a drug that incited criminality, sexual deviance, and defiant be-
havior in African-Americans. 93 This framing of cocaine in moral terms
prompted its movement from the market regime to the criminal regula-
tory regime.94 So persuasive was this characterization of cocaine that in
the ensuing hysteria, Southern police departments switched from .32 to
.38 caliber bullets due to widespread reports that cocaine-endowed Afri-
can-Americans with extraordinary cunning and strength thus rendering
them virtually invincible to conventional weaponry. 95 Despite whites'
fears that cocaine would provoke an African-American-led revolt and
crime spree, none ever materialized. 96 Nevertheless, the fear that these
myths and fantasies evoked was enough to ease the passage of several
laws restricting cocaine use, including the nation's first criminal drug
control law, the Harrison Act of 1914.97
The regulation of anabolic androgenic steroids (AAS), a commer-
cially manufactured pharmaceutical drug, is also illustrative of the Regu-
92 See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 35, at 7. Cocaine was legal and
widely used recreationally during the 1800s. CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 35 at 132. Its
ability to constrict blood vessels and limit bleeding made it an effective local anesthetic for
eye, nose, and throat surgeries. Id. at 131-32. It was also used to treat ailments, such as
sinusitis and hay fever as well as opium, morphine, and alcohol addiction. MusTo, THE AMER-
ICAN DISEASE, supra note 35, at 7.
93 See id. See also Edward H. Williams, The Drug-Habit Menacing in the South, in
DRUGS IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 35, at 360, 363 (alleging in-
creased sexuality in African-American cocaine users).
94 See MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 35, at 8.
95 See id. at 7; Williams, supra note 93, at 361.
96 David T. Courtwright, The Hidden Epidemic: Opiate Addiction and Cocaine Use in
the South, 1860-1920, 49 J. S. HIST. 57, 71 (1983) (hypothesizing that few cocaine induced
criminal acts spurred irrational fears in Southern whites similar to white's fears of slave upris-
ings in the antebellum South).
97 One of the primary forces behind passage of the Harrison Act was Dr. Hamilton
Wright, the State Department's Opium Commissioner during Theodore Roosevelt's adminis-
tration, who wrote that cocaine was "a potent incentive in driving humbler Negroes all over the
country to abnormal crimes." JOHN HELMER, DRUGS AND MINORITY OPPRESSION supra note
90 at 53. Dr. Wright alleged that:
Once the negro has reached the state of being a 'dope taker'- and a very few
experimental sniffs of the drug make him an habitu-he is a constant menace to his
community until he is eliminated. For his whole nature is changed for the worse by
the habit. Sexual desires are increased and perverted, peaceful negroes become
quarrelsome, and timid negroes develop a degree of 'Dutch courage' that is some-
times almost incredible. A large proportion of the wholesale killings in the South
during recent years have been the direct result of cocaine and frequently the perpe-
trators of these crimes have been hitherto inoffensive, law-abiding negroes. Moreo-
ver, the negro who has once formed the habit seems absolutely beyond redemption.
Imprisonment 'cures' him temporarily: but when released he returns to the drug al-
most invariably.
Williams, supra note 93, at 360-63. Wright would later maintain that "the negro drug-taker"
should be incarcerated rather than treated for his addiction. Id. at 3
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latory Regime/Norms Model. 98 For nearly half a century, AAS had been
classified as prescription drugs and the FDA had regulated them in the
public health regime. 99 The sale of AAS for other than medicinal pur-
poses, however, was criminalized with passage of the Anabolic Steroid
Control Act of 1990, which added the drug to Schedule III of the Con-
trolled Substances Act. 1°° AAS were not relegated to the criminal re-
gime because of their alleged health effects or concerns about illicit
trafficking. 10 1 Rather, AAS were criminalized because of their place at
the center of a cheating scandal at the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic
Games and the subsequent dramatic coverage of AAS use in a series of
articles published in Sports Illustrated.10 2
On November 18, 1988, scarcely a month after Canadian sprinter
Ben Johnson was stripped of his Olympic gold medal having tested posi-
tive for AAS after beating American rival Carl Lewis in a world record
setting race, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988.103 This law amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
98 AAS, synthetic derivatives of the naturally occurring hormone testosterone, were de-
vised to maximize testosterone's anabolic, or tissue-building capacity, while minimizing many
of its androgenic, or masculinizing effects. See Charles E. Yesalis, Introduction, in ANABOLIC
STEROIDS IN SPORT AND EXERCISE 1, 1 (Charles E. Yesalis ed., 2d ed. 2000). See also Cynthia
M. Kuhn, Anabolic Steroids, 57 RECENT PROGRESS N HoRMoNE RES. 411, 412 (2002)
(describing anabolic steroid characteristics). AAS have therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses
unlike narcotics, which are taken for their consciousness altering effects. See Charles D.
Kochakian & Charles E. Yesalis, Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids: A Historical Perspective and
Definition, in ANABOLIC STEROIDS IN SPORT AND EXERCISE 17, 35-40 (Charles E. Yesalis ed.,
2d ed. 2000).
99 Since the 1938 passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the
FDA has regulated AAS. See Adrian Wilairat, Comment, Faster, Higher, Stronger? Federal
Efforts to Criminalize Anabolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 377, 387 (2005). The FDCA sets criteria to classify prescription drugs and limit access
to particular drugs to people who demonstrate a legitimate medical need. See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-99 (2006)). Thus, the FDA determines whether a substance will be classified as pre-
scription or over-the-counter. Id.
100 See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (classifying AAS
within Schedule II1(e) in 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)).
101 See Anabolic Steroids Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong. 21 (1990) [hereinafter Anabolic Steroids
Control Act Hearing] (statement of Leslie Southwick, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
102 Sports Illustrated published an issue the week after Ben Johnson was disqualified
featuring him on the cover emblazoned with the heading "Busted!" William 0. Johnson &
Kenny Moore, The Loser, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1988, at 32-39. The article, about
Johnson's fall from grace, recounted the events leading to disqualification and discussed the
perceived ease with which athletes evade AAS detection. Id. See also Tommy Chaikin &
Rick Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at 82-102
(explaining college linebacker Tommy Chaikin's steroid induced transformations and suicide
attempt).
103 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P. L. No. 100-690, § 2403, 102 Stat. 4203 (1988).
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Act by establishing a new criminal provision that significantly increased
the penalties for AAS distribution. 104
Within months, Congress held a series of hearings on whether to
add AAS to the schedule of controlled substances.10 5 At these hearings,
scant evidence was presented that AAS use posed a significant threat to
healthy adult men. 106 Furthermore, just months before the 1988 Olym-
pics, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) recommended against scheduling
AAS.1 07 Legislators, nevertheless, emerged victorious in their efforts to
frame AAS to fit the moral norms of the criminal regime.10 8 The mor-
ally charged issue of cheating in sports had specific resonance in the
104 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made the distribution or possession of AAS with
the intent to distribute without a valid prescription a felony subject to up to three years impris-
onment and a fine. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2006). Distribution or possession with intent to
distribute to persons under eighteen years of age would result in up to six years imprisonment
and a fine. Pub. L. 100-690 (1988) (current version codified as The Anabolic Steroids Control
Act of 1990). In addition, the law subjected AAS traffickers to criminal forfeiture. See
§ 333(a). The law also increased the penalties for the distribution of Human Growth Hormone
to a maximum of five years for possession with intent to distribute, and ten years if the offense
involved a minor. See § 333(e)(2).
105 See Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Abuse of
Steroids in Amateur and Professional Athletics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Steroids in Amateur and Profes-
sional Sports: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Abuse: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong., 1 st & 2d Sess. (1989); Anabolic Steroid Restriction Act of 1989:
Hearing on H.R. 995 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
106 The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the Steroid Trafficking Act focused pri-
marily on the most inflammatory testimony presented during the hearings, despite the fact that
there was little scientific or medical evidence to support these claims and that most of these
allegations were based on anecdotal accounts, surveys, and self-reports. See S. REP. No. 101-
433 (1989). The report presented few dissenting opinions and did not mention the American
Medical Association's opposition to drug scheduling. See S. REP. No. 101-433, at 5-8 (1989).
107 In 1987, the Department of Justice solicited the opinions of the DEA and the HHS on
whether to schedule AAS under the CSA. Anabolic Steroids Control Act Hearing, supra note
101, at 21. The DEA recommended against scheduling and the HHS concurred after finding
that "the available evidentiary base concerning steroids, although growing, is not comprehen-
sive. The data available do not establish that steroids possess psychoactive effects comparable
to those substances currently scheduled." See id.
108 In his opening remarks during one of the legislative hearings, then Delaware Senator,
Joseph R. Biden, who presided over the hearing, recounted the events of the 1988 Seoul Olym-
pics and noted that one of the most troubling aspects of AAS use was that it undermined "our
value system, the so-called American way." Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports,
supra note 105. When asked why Congress was focusing on AAS as opposed to other drugs,
Biden explained, "the thing that disturbs me most about this issue beyond the health effects, as
bad as they are, is this notion that we are undermining the very raison d'etre, the very reason
that sports play such a major role in America, particularly among our young." Id. at 102.
Biden emphasized, "we need to consider adding steroids to the list of 'controlled substances,'
treating them the same way we treat other dangerous drugs such as cocaine and heroin." Id. at
4. Biden's remarks are representative of tenor of the testimony presented at the hearings. See
MAKING SENSE OF DRUG REGULATION
criminal regulatory regime that was not present in the public health or
market regimes. This enabled Congress to criminalize nonmedical AAS
sales legislatively, over objections from the American Medical Associa-
tion, FDA, and DEA.1°9 In so doing, Congress circumvented the forty-
year-old administrative drug scheduling process and thereby set a drug
regulatory precedent.
The Regulatory Regime/Norms model also explains passage of the
historic Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.110 Drugs sold prior to 1906
ran the gamut from well-intentioned but ineffective medicines to patently
phony nostrums."' The quality of these drugs was generally unreliable
and of questionable purity because many drugs, including "soothing syr-
ups" for infants, contained inert substances and often some quantity of
cocaine, opium, alcohol, arsenic, mercury, or other narcotic, addictive, or
lethal drug."12 Estimations at the time put the death toll from such drugs
in the tens of thousands.1 13 Despite the obvious need for regulation, the
ethos of the market regime was that it was up to the consumer to take
appropriate precautions against adulterated and fake drugs.' 14 Thus,
there was little protection for drug consumers because assumption of risk
and rational choice principles dominated the market regime.
In 1905, however, those who championed drug control legislation-
primarily women and physicians-successfully characterized the issue in
a way that resonated with the norms of the public health regime. Rather
109 AAS were added to Schedule HI of the CSA, when President Bush signed into law the
Crime Control Act of 1990, on November 29, 1990. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
110 Pure Food and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (amended 1907).
111 See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 16-17 (1961) [hereinafter
TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES]. One drug, for example, an alleged "brain tonic" created to allevi-
ate headaches and aptly named, Cuforhedake Brane-Fude, contained a potentially lethal mix-
ture of alcohol, caffeine and acetanilid, among other drugs. See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE
MEDICAL MESSIAHS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HEALTH QUACKERY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 4-6 (1967) [hereinafter MEDICAL MESSIAHS]. See also PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING
AMERICAN'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 48
(2003) ("Peruna, an industry leader, was a remedy sold for a variety of illnesses, from colds
and congestion ... to tuberculosis, inflamed appendix, the mumps, and 'female complaints.'
The main secret ingredients in the bottle were alcohol and water, with 28 percent of the mix-
ture pure alcohol.").
112 See YOUNG, PURE FOOD, supra note 37, at 29, 258 (discussing often fatal soothing
syrups for infants). See also HILTS, supra note 111, at 48; YOUNG, MEDICAL MESSIAHS, supra
note 111, at 4-6.
1t3 See HILTS, supra note 111, at 46.
114 See id. at 29. For example, echoing the dominant sentiment of the time, Dr. John H.
Griscom of the New York Academy of Medicine suggested that the problem "lies rather with
the public which patronizes, and not so much with the tradesman who profits by" the sale of
patent drugs. Id. Similarly, U.S. Representative William Adamson of Georgia dubbed the
proposed Pure Food and Drug Act, "pure foolishness," and objected to its passage by arguing
that "the Federal Government was not created for the purpose of cutting your toe nails or
corns." See YOUNG, PURE FOOD, supra note 37, at 253 (citation omitted).
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than highlight the immorality of selling toxic, addictive, or lethal
drugs-which would have moved dangerous drugs into the criminal reg-
ulatory regime-these reformers instead argued that the contents of haz-
ardous drugs should be disclosed because individuals cannot make safe
decisions about drug consumption if they are unaware of what is in their
drugs. 115 Pointing to high profile exposds of the drug industry to ad-
vance their claims, 116 these reformers persuasively characterized the
problem in a way that resonated with the disclosure norms of the nascent
public health regime and, in so doing, forced passage of the Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1906.117 The unprecedented legislation did not
criminalize or ban the manufacture or sale of dangerous drugs, but rather
centered public health concerns. 118 The Act prohibited misrepresentation
in drug labeling and mandated that manufacturers disclose the presence
and amount of certain drugs, including alcohol, opium, cocaine, heroin,
morphine, chloroform, or acetanilide, although it did not prohibit inclu-
sion of such substances. 119 Thus, although the Pure Food and Drug Act
predated regulatory regimes as we know them today, by disrupting the
115 See YOUNG, PURE FOOD, supra note 37, at 258. U.S. Representative James Robert
Mann of Illinois, who was instrumental in passing the Pure Food and Drug Act, argued, to
great applause from his colleagues in the House, that "[w]e can not undertake to prevent the
man who is an opium fiend from obtaining opium, but we can undertake to prevent the man
who never wishes to take opium from taking it without knowing he is taking it." Id. During
hearings on the bill, Mann cited case histories of those unwittingly addicted to or killed by
drugs, particularly infants poisoned by lethal doses of morphine in soothing syrups. Id. Ac-
cording to these reformers, disclosure was the only way for the public to protect against the
danger and deception posed by drugs. See id. at 258-59.
116 See YOUNG, TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES, supra note 111, at 234, 239-40. The publica-
tion of Upton Sinclair's best-selling novel, The Jungle, which described in graphic detail the
unsanitary condition of Chicago meat packinghouses, was instrumental in fueling public sup-
port for food and drug regulations. See id. at 239. The effects of The Jungle were com-
pounded by articles highlighting the fraud and malfeasance on the part of patent medicine
manufacturers, which appeared in such magazines as Ladies' Home Journal. See id. at
212-13, 234. A damning series of articles by Samuel Hopkins Adams in Collier's magazine
revealed that many well-known patent medicines were little more than narcotics mixed with
inert substances, and this included patent drugs intended for use by children. Id. at 219-25,
275 (citing Samuel Hopkins Adams' collection of articles, The Great American Fraud, origi-
nally published in Collier's magazine from 1905 to 1907).
117 See YOUNG, PURE FOOD, supra note 37, at 208 (noting the AMA's pressure on the
Senate to control "worthless, dangerous and enslaving drugs").
118 See id. at 264 (highlighting that the Food and Drug Act rested on the idea that "if the
consumer was adequately informed, he could protect himself against deception, even against
danger").
119 See id. at 267. The law prohibited labels that had "any statement, design or device
regarding such article, or the ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false
or misleading in any particular." Id. The law did not require that other substances be listed,
however, if the manufacturer advertised that the product contained a particular drug, this repre-
sentation, and the amount claimed, had to be accurate. Id. Violation of the act was a misde-
meanor offense that could render one subject to a fine not to exceed $200 for a first offense or
$300 for each subsequent offense and/or imprisonment not to exceed a year. Id. at 268.
Adulterated or misbranded drugs were also subject to seizure. Id.
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norms of the market regime and characterizing drugs in a way that was
consistent with the disclosure norms of the burgeoning public health re-
gime, reformers were able to pave the way for passage of the first federal
law to regulate drugs in the name of public health. 120
As we have seen with marijuana, cocaine, AAS, and the passage of
the Pure Food and Drug Act, specific social events can create opportuni-
ties for those who engage in drug designation contests to succeed in char-
acterizing a drug in a way that penetrates public thinking and makes
regulatory regime changes possible. As the Regulatory Regime/Norms
model makes clear, there is a contingency as to how a drug becomes
vulnerable to the framing contests that lead to drug regulatory regime
change. Anabolic steroids demonstrate this contingency. It is quite con-
ceivable that had it not been for the Olympic cheating scandal, anabolic
steroids could have become over-the-counter drugs regulated with age
restrictions, much like tobacco and alcohol. Likewise, based on its broad
social appeal, if marijuana were discovered today it might not be
criminalized. Similarly, widely published exposds of the drug industry
allowed drug regulation advocates, at the turn of the century, to focus
public attention on their argument that drug makers should be required to
disclose the contents of their drugs.' 2' However, these contingencies of
historical context and physical place do not drive regulatory outcomes,
but simply create opportunities for interested parties to characterize a
drug in a way that shapes its popular understanding.
The Regulatory Regime/Norms model posits that the way a drug
will be regulated is not a path-dependent story. 122 How a drug is pres-
ently regulated is relevant to how it will be regulated in the future, but it
120 See Food and Drug Administration, Legislation, http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnfor-
mation/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) ("The Food and Drugs Act of 1906
was the first of more than 200 laws that constitute one of the world's most comprehensive and
effective networks of public health and consumer protections.").
121 See Brian Rubens, Common Law versus Regulatory Fraud: Parsing the Internet Re-
quirement of the Felony Penalty Provision of the Food and Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1501, 1506 (2005) (noting a manufactured drug that "killed hundreds of people
after a manufacturer distributed a drug that it failed to test for safety").
122 Lockhart defines path dependence as follows: "[O]nce a society starts building partic-
ular public institutions (e.g., a presidential as opposed to parliamentary democracy) or policies
(e.g., the financing of medical care), it becomes increasingly difficult across time to effect
institutional or policy change which breaks free of the initial path's confining influence."
CHARLES LOCKHART, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCETIIONALISM: INsTITUTIONS, CULTURE
AND PoLIcms 7 (2003). Klein and Marmor write that path dependency:
is simply another way of describing the incremental, adaptive nature of much policy
making .... The fact that policy makers faced with a new problem tend to draw on
an established repertory of tools reinforces the bias of public policy against radical
innovation, as does dependence on existing organizations for delivery .... More
narrowly and rigorously, path dependency is seen as flowing from the structure of
interests created by policy .... Decisions taken at point A in time entrench-some-
times indeed create-interests that come to constrain decisions at point B."
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is not dispositive. The critical factor in this determination is how suc-
cessfully the drug is framed. For example, a drug that has already been
criminalized or one that is mass-consumed may be more difficult to shift
into another regime than a newly discovered drug. The Regime/Norms
model indicates that this is because, unlike newly discovered drugs, the
social meaning of which is indeterminate and ambiguous, those drugs
that are well-established in a regime already have meaning conferred in
them. As a result, in order to move these drugs one must destabilize the
existing meaning of the drug in relation to its current regime. Then the
framing process can be used to signify the drug in relation to the norms
of a different regime, and in so doing, prompt individuals to think and
feel differently about the drug so as to allow for a regime re-designation.
The recent shift of tobacco from the market regime to the public health
regime provides a more in-depth example of this phenomenon.
B. A Closer Look at the Model: Tobacco
Although tobacco products are the leading cause of preventable
death in the United States,1 23 killing over 440,000 people annually 124
Rudolf Klein & Theodore Marmor, Reflections on Policy Analysis: Putting It Together Again,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 890, 900-01 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein, & Rob-
ert E. Goodin eds., 2006). As Richard Pildes puts it: "[O]ne of the iron laws of democratic
institutions is that institutional structures, once created, become refractory to change. Identities
and interests coalesce around existing institutional arrangements." Richard H. Pildes, The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 29, 84 (2004).
123 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Targeting the Nation's Leading Killer: At
a Glance 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/aag/osh.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2010).
124 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of
Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses - United States, 2000-2004, 57 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 45, 1226-28 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5745a3.htm. Smoking has been definitively linked to the development of heart
diseases, strokes, bronchitis, emphysema, cardiovascular disease (atherosclerosis and abdomi-
nal aortic aneurysm), respiratory disease (impaired lung function, chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disease, asthma, and pneumonia), brain aneurisms, acute myeloid leukemia, and cancer of
the throat, mouth, tongue, lip, larynx, colon, esophagus, pharynx, lungs, bladder, kidneys, pan-
creas, stomach, breast and cervix. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004), available
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/smokingconsequences/. Among women, tobacco
consumption contributes to low bone density, osteoporosis and pregnancy complications in-
cluding low birthweight babies, preterm delivery, stillbirth and fetal death. Id. Researchers
have recently isolated a chemical in tobacco that may contribute to the development of diabe-
tes, cancer, Alzheimer's disease and accelerate the ageing process. See Tobacco Chemical
Blamed for Disease, BBC NEWS WORLD EDMON, Oct. 29, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/health/2361167.stm (citing study by Scripps Research Institute). Today, approxi-
mately 8.6 million people in the United States suffer from smoking related illnesses. Ameri-
can Cancer Society, Study: 8.6 Million Americans Sick With Tobacco-Related Illnesses, Nov.
5, 2003, http://www.cancer.org/docrootNWS/contentNWS_2-lx-Study_86_MillionAmeri-
cansSickWithTobacco-relatedIllnesses.asp. There are at least sixty-four carcinogens in
cigarette smoke; of these, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has classi-
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(more than the combined number of those killed by AIDS, alcohol, car
accidents, illicit drugs, homicide, and suicides), 125 tobacco has been reg-
ulated, for over a century, in the market regime, and tobacco manufactur-
ers have been extremely resilient and resourceful in staving off
meaningful public health regulation. Manufacturers have accomplished
this by effectively using advertising to shape popular conceptions of to-
bacco and drive acceptance.1 26
While one might assume that tobacco's ability to avoid regulation is
due to its historical popularity and prevalence of use, the Regulatory Re-
gime/Norms model suggests otherwise. A comparison with alcohol, an
equally popular drug, provides an instructive example. During the late
nineteenth century, the temperance movement identified smoking as a
"dirty habit" responsible for many social ills.127 Drawing no distinction
between alcohol and tobacco,128 these prohibitionists framed the use of
these drugs as a moral threat that undermined not only individual and
public health, but also Victorian notions of self-discipline and control. 129
Unlike alcohol, which would be relegated to the criminal regime after the
fled eleven as proven human carcinogens, six as probable human carcinogens, and forty-six as
possible human carcinogens. See Dietrich Hoffmann & Ilse Hoffmann, The Changing Ciga-
rette, 1950-1995, 307 J. TOxICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 316 (1997) (citing INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC
RISKS TO HUMANS UPDATE (Supp. 7, 1987), vols. 43-66 (1988-1996)). Tobacco smoke con-
tains over 4,000 chemical compounds, including: particles and gases, such as nicotine, tar,
benzine, carbon monoxide, ammonia, dimethylnitrosamine, hydrogen, cyanide, acrolein and
formaldehyde. See Q & A: Passive Smoking, BBC NEWS, Oct. 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/health/medicalnotes/3235820.stm (citing findings of the Scientific Committee on To-
bacco and Health).
125 ERIC LINDBLOM, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS 1 (2009), available at http:l
www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf.
126 See ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETrE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 31-33, 54-55, 313-14 (2007). See
also NEIL H. BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING, 207-49 (1944); Patrick
Porter, Advertising in the Early Cigarette Industry: W. Duke, Sons & Company of Durham, 69
N.C. HIST. REV. 1, 41 (1971).
127 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 45-46.
128 See id. ("Temperance reformers drew no distinction between tobacco and alcohol: in
their view, immorality led to bad health and unhealthful living to immoral life.").
129 See id. at 46-47 ("'The anti-tobacco crusade is a moral one, just as was the struggle
for temperance,' wrote the social reformer Vida Milholland. 'It is a fight to free our beloved
nation from a form of mental slavery, to which she is submitting, as long as she permits the
poisoned drug, tobacco, to spread its fumes, like a pall over the land."; "An 1884 New York
Times editorial stated the national crisis in no uncertain terms: 'The decadence of Spain began
when the Spaniards adopted cigarettes, and if this pernicious practice obtains among adults
Americans the ruin of the Republic is close at hand.'"; "In 1916, [Henry Ford] published a
widely circulated compendium of anti-tobacco materials under the title The Case Against the
Little White Slaver and vowed not to hire smokers: 'Boys who smoke cigarettes we do not care
to keep in our employ. In the future we will not hire anyone whom we know to be addicted to
this habit .... We made a study of the effect upon the morals and efficiency of men in our
employ addicted to this habit and found that cigarette smokers were loose in their morals, very
apt to be untruthful .... ').
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1919 ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, tobacco remained in the
market regime due to the industry's dramatic increase in advertising
spending.130 Between 1910 and 1913, during the height of the temper-
ance movement's prominence, tobacco manufacturers increased expendi-
tures on cigarette advertising by nearly 200 percent, which precipitated a
seismic shift in public understanding of their drug.' 3'
In order to create public acceptance of tobacco, cigarette companies
spent the remainder of the twentieth century, using advertising to frame
tobacco in a way that was consistent with the rational choice and as-
sumption of risk norms of the market regime. In so doing, the cigarette
industry succeeded in transforming common perceptions of tobacco con-
sumption; the public came to view tobacco as being no different from
other hazardous but enjoyable products that were generally tolerated and
regulated with moderation, such as knives, chainsaws, and snowmo-
biles. 32 Therefore, according to the industry, tobacco consumption, like
other potentially dangerous activities, such as skiing, parachuting or
whitewater rafting, should be permitted so long as the person engaged in
the activity has a good, if not perfect, understanding of the risks
involved.
Even the U.S. Surgeon General's 1964 declaration that cigarettes
posed a significant health hazard and contributed to many life-threaten-
ing diseases, including lung cancer, did not weaken the tobacco indus-
try's foothold in the market regime. 133 Shortly after the release of the
Surgeon General's report, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-the
regulatory agency with primary control over the advertising of tobacco
products-promulgated regulations requiring that tobacco products con-
tain warnings,1 34 and Congress enacted legislation prohibiting tobacco
companies from advertising on television or radio.135 Although cigarette
sales dropped immediately after publication of the Surgeon General's re-
port, by 1966, sales had reached record levels, and by June of 1967, the
130 See id. at 54. In 1910, the tobacco industry spent an estimated $13 million on adver-
tising, with cigarettes accounting for nearly one-third of this sum. Id. By 1913, expenditures
on cigarette advertising alone would account for $13 million. Id.
131 See id.
132 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 280.
133 See THE SURGEON GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, 31-32 (1964). The
U.S. Surgeon General declared that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient impor-
tance in the U.S. to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id. at 33.
134 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964).
135 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat. 87, 89
(1969) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000)).
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FTC could find "virtually no evidence that the warning statements on
cigarette packages had any significant effect." 136
Tobacco manufacturers' ability to survive this seemingly inevitable
redesignation of their drugs to the public health regime was due to their
success at using government-mandated warning labels to frame the act of
smoking in a way that was consonant with the dominant market regime
norms of assumption of risk and rational choice. According to their
logic, as long as rational people in a free society are aware of the risks
involved in smoking, they should have a right to engage in the activ-
ity. 137 Thus, the industry was able to promote cigarette use as an act of
independence and rebellion, while at the same time transforming the
warning labels into disclaimers that would eventually shield cigarette
manufacturers from future liability. 138
The regulatory landscape began to change for tobacco when, during
the early 1970s, the first of two events allowed public health reformers to
undermine the tobacco industry's characterization of its drug in relation
to the norms of the market regime and frame the drug in a way that was
resonant with the norms of the public health regime, where the drug
would ultimately be reassigned. In 1972, a report of the U.S. Surgeon
General concluded that cigarette smoking was not only harmful to smok-
ers but also to those around them. 139 So called "second-hand smoke"
presented a health hazard to non-smokers, and as such, undermined the
assumption of risk norms upon which the market regime is premised.
When smoking was understood as an individual behavior that posed little
risk to others, tobacco manufacturers were able to remain in the market
regime by arguing successfully that government regulation raised the
specter of "Big Brother" and represented paternalistic overreaching by
the state. Thus, for decades, smokers were allowed to assume the often
fatal risks attendant to their own behavior. These risks, however, were
not assumed by nonsmokers but were rather imposed upon them, essen-
136 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 257. In 1974, per capital consumption of tobacco
products was approximately 4,100 cigarettes per year-virtually the same as it had been a
decade earlier. See id. at 280.
137 See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy, and
Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 953 (criticizing cigarette manu-
facturers' position that smokers assume the risk of their behavior); Ellen Wertheimer, Pan-
dora's Humidor: Tobacco Producer Liability in Tort, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 397, 417 & n.48
(noting that a position often asserted by tobacco manufacturers in litigation is that "smokers
assume all dangers that [cigarettes] involve").
138 This strategy would ultimately protect the company from liability years later during a
wave of tobacco litigation. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding
that federal law preempts state failure to warn claims against cigarette manufacturers).
139 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING, SURGEON GEN. REP., 121-35 (1972). The Surgeon General reiterated this finding in
subsequent reports published in 1979 and 1984. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, SURGEON GEN. REP., 1-25, 21-17 (1979).
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tially transforming these individuals into involuntary smokers. This in-
troduction of the "innocent victim" dramatically changed the equation in
favor of regulation.1 40 In 1973, just one year after the release of the
Surgeon General's report on second hand smoke, Arizona became the
first state to restrict smoking in public places, and by 1981 no fewer than
thirty-six states had passed legislation limiting when and where people
could smoke.14 1
The damage to the tobacco industry prompted by the discovery that
smoking caused illness in nonsmokers was compounded by the subse-
140 Tobacco smoke presents a health hazard even for those who are not actively smoking.
So called, "second-hand smoke" can cause headaches, sore throat, eye irritation, dizziness and
nausea. Q & A: Passive Smoking, supra note 124. Exposure for only 30 minutes can reduce
coronary blood flow. Id. (citing findings of the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health).
A team of researchers from the National Cancer Institute found that tobacco smoke produces
substantially more fine particulate matter-the most dangerous component of air pollution-
than diesel exhaust. Smoking More Toxic than Car Fumes, BBC NEWS, Aug. 24, 2004, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3590578.stm (citing studies conducted by the Na-
tional Cancer Institute and the Tobacco Control Unit). Thus, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has classified environmental tobacco smoke as a class A carcinogen, along with
asbestos and arsenic. Q & A: Passive Smoking, supra note 124. Studies have shown that non-
smokers exposed to second-hand smoke for long periods of time increase their risk of heart
disease and lung cancer by 25%. Id. Even low levels of exposure to tobacco smoke in the
home have been linked to reduced test results in reading and math among children. See To-
bacco Smoke Dulls Child Brains, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/health/4145645.stm (citing study of 4,400 children by the U.S. Children's Environmental
Health Center). The greater the exposure to second-hand smoke, the more pronounced the
decline in mathematical and reading abilities. In homes where both parents smoke, young
children have a 72% increased risk of respiratory illness, including bronchitis and pneumonia.
See Q & A: Passive Smoking, supra note 124. Researchers have found that children exposed
to cigarette smoke may harbor other harmful organisms, such as streptococcus pneumonia,
because the smoke interferes with the 'healthy' bacteria normally found in the nose and throat.
See Nicholas Bakalar, In Children, Rise in Bacteria is Linked to Smoke, N.Y. TitEs, Mar. 21,
2006, available at http://query.nytimes.congst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E6D91F3lF932A157
50COA9609C8B63. Additional studies have concluded that tobacco trapped in household dust
can expose children to the equivalent of several hours of smoking. Smoke in Dust Poses
Health Risk, BBC NEWS, Feb. 24, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/
3508035.stm (citing study of 49 homes with infants aged between two and twelve months
conducted by researchers at San Diego State University). Even in homes where adults smoked
outside, the levels of tobacco contaminants were seven times higher than in smoke-free homes.
Id. Tobacco toxicity levels were up to eight times higher in homes where adults smoked inside
than in homes where no adults smoked. Id. Residual smoke particles have been linked to
increased risk of asthma and sudden infant death. Id. An infant's exposure to these toxins
continues even months after the smoking has ceased. Id. Researchers contend that infants and
children are particularly susceptible to inhaling this type of second-hand smoke because of the
amount of time they spend indoors, their close physical proximity to the smoker(s), and their
breathing rates being higher than that of adults, allowing them to inhale more contaminants.
Id.
141 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 288-89. Arizona prohibited smoking in elevators,
theaters, museums, libraries, and buses, and designated smoking areas in government build-
ings, healthcare facilities, and other public spaces. Id. at 288. Minnesota became the first state
to pass comprehensive anti-smoking legislation, when, in 1975, the state enacted the Clean
Indoor Air Act, which banned smoking in most public offices, stores and banks. Id.
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quent revelation that tobacco manufacturers had withheld their knowl-
edge that nicotine in tobacco products caused addiction. 42 This
discovery first came to light shortly after the April 14, 1994 joint appear-
ance before Congress of top executives from several major tobacco com-
panies, who testified that the nicotine in their products was not addictive
and that they did not adjust nicotine levels in tobacco. 143 Despite high-
level tobacco industry executives' public disavowal of tobacco's addic-
tiveness, later that year, two former Philip Morris scientists testified
before Congress that a series of studies commissioned by the company
on the pharmacodynamics and neurological effects of nicotine deter-
mined that tobacco was, indeed, a highly addictive drug. 144 Additional
leaked documents provided incontrovertible proof that tobacco manufac-
turers knew that nicotine was addictive many years before it was com-
monly known.1 45 Evidence showed that tobacco companies intentionally
142 Nicotine, one of the powerful alkaloids found in tobacco products, is highly addictive.
Studies have demonstrated that nicotine is as addictive as cocaine, morphine and other opiates.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:
NICOTINE ADDICTION, SURGEON GEN. REP. No. 88-8406, i (1988).
143 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 365-66. According to one industry executive, James
Johnston of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., "[wie do not do anything to hook smokers or keep
them hooked." He continued, "we no more manipulate nicotine in cigarettes than coffee mak-
ers manipulate caffeine." Jill Zuckman, Tobacco Executives at Hearing; Nicotine Focus of
House Unit, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1994, at A3.
144 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at
17-18, (1995) (statements of former Philip Morris scientists, Victor DeNoble and Paul Mele).
The researchers testified that the tobacco company used "exactly the same tests" that the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse used to determine whether a drug has a potential for abuse. Id.
at 17.
145 Industry documents showed that tobacco firms knew for decades about nicotine's
powerful pharmacological effects. See David A. Kessler et al., The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's Regulation of Tobacco Products, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 988 (1996). In an internal
memo, the general counsel to Brown and Williamson, a tobacco company, stated: "[N]icotine
is addictive .... We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug." Analysis
Regarding The Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-Containing Ciga-
rettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,611 (Aug. 11, 1995) (citing a
1963 internal tobacco industry document); see also John Slade et al., Nicotine Addiction: The
Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 225, 228 (1995). Another memo from 1972
written by an R. J. Reynolds research scientist averred: "Thus, a tobacco product is, in essence,
a vehicle for the delivery of nicotine, designed to deliver the nicotine in a generally acceptable
and attractive form. Our industry is then based upon design, manufacture and sales of attrac-
tive dosage forms of nicotine which have more overall value, tangible or intangible, to the
consumer than those of our competitors." BRANDT, supra note 126, at 318. Other memos
indicated that Philip Morris considered suppressing evidence that withdrawal from nicotine
was similar to that of other highly addictive drugs, including morphine. See John Schwartz,
Tobacco Officials Discussed Hiding Data, Memos Indicate, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at
A3. These documents also demonstrated that the companies intended their products to be
nicotine delivery devices. In 1972, a Philip Morris executive remarked: "Think of the cigarette
pack as a storage container for a day's supply of nicotine. . . .Think of the cigarette as a
dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine .... Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nico-
tine.... Smoke is beyond question the most optimized vehicle of nicotine and the cigarette the
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engineered cigarettes to provide carefully calibrated doses of nicotine to
smokers in order to manipulate cigarettes' addictiveness and control the
rate at which nicotine is delivered to and absorbed into the blood-
stream.146 Although tobacco manufacturers tried to frame this informa-
tion as proprietary and properly protected as trade secrets, public health
reformers successfully framed this withholding of information as a dis-
closure failure, which opened the door to public health regulation the
following year.1 47 Reversing nearly a century of policy, President Clin-
ton, on August 10, 1995, announced that he would seek to use his execu-
tive authority to grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco. 148
It is important to note that despite the fact that the Surgeon General
had issued a report in 1988 concluding that nicotine in cigarettes was an
addictive drug, it was not until public health reformers framed the to-
bacco industry's actions as a disclosure failure that they were able to
penetrate the market regime by framing the drug in relation to public
health regime norms.
Drug makers often justify the withholding of information by argu-
ing that competitive pressure to protect corporate interests and maximize
profits discourage them from releasing medical and scientific data on the
health impact of the drugs they manufacture. 149 These arguments reso-
most optimized dispenser of smoke." Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's
Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed.
Reg. 41,453, 41,617 (Aug. 11, 1995) (citing a 1972 Philip Morris internal memorandum).
Similarly, in another industry document an R. J. Reynolds executive maintained that "[i]n a
sense, the tobacco industry may be thought of as being a specialized, highly ritualized, and
stylized segment of the pharmaceutical industry. Tobacco products uniquely contain and de-
liver nicotine, a potent drug with a variety of physiological effects." Id. at 41, 617-18 (citing
Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Convenes Grand Jury to Look at Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
1995, at Al).
146 See, e.g., Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
less Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 45,110-11, 45,127
(Aug. 28, 1995). See also Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdic-
tion Over Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg.
41,453, 41,710 (Aug. 11, 1995).
147 See David M. Forman, Note, Big Tobacco: An Impenetrable Industry Regulators Can
Only Hope to Contain, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 147, & n.132 (1997). See also U.S.
Tobacco Co. v. Harshbarger, 1997 WL 137200 at *1, *2 (noting that U.S. Tobacco Co.'s "real
grievance [with a Massachusetts law requiring them to disclose ingredient information] is that
they will suffer serious harm from . . . public disclosure of their confidential information.").
148 See President's News Conference, 31 WKLY CoMp. PREs. Doc., 1415 (Aug. 10, 1995).
See also Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-
Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,426 (Aug.
11, 1995).
149 See Alex Berenson, Despite Vow, Drug Makers Still Withhold Data, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2005, at At; Editorial, Drugs and Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at A22; Barry
Meier, For Drug Makers, a Downside to Full Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.comI2007/05/23/business/23drug.html. The pharmaceutical industry, for exam-
ple, has consistently opposed government-mandated disclosure. See Berenson, supra at At.
Pharmaceutical companies test their products in thousands of clinical trials each year and the
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nate in the market regime. As we have seen, however, if public health
reformers can frame this withholding of information as a disclosure fail-
ure, as opposed to an assumed risk, they may succeed in changing public
understanding of the drug in relation to the market regime, and shift the
drug into the public health regime where disclosure norms resonate.
Market regime norms were further disrupted when reformers argued
successfully that, as an addictive drug, tobacco is fundamentally incom-
patible with the norms of rational choice.' 50 Reformers revealed that
tobacco industry executives, in direct contravention of their testimony
before Congress, had spent decades surreptitiously marketing tobacco
products to minors, a group defined as unable to assume certain risks. 151
Armed with this powerful evidence, the FDA, in accordance with its
authority enumerated under the FDCA, asserted its power to regulate cig-
arettes as combined drugs and drug delivery devices, and promulgated a
regulation aimed at reducing smoking in young people. 152 Although the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the FDA's attempt to claim jurisdiction
over tobacco products by ruling that the regulatory authority the FDA
sought to exercise must be delegated by Congress, on June 10, 2009,
Congress responded by passing the Family Smoking Prevention and To-
bacco Control Act. 153 The Act grants the FDA explicit authority over
tobacco products and the power to regulate their manufacture, sale, dis-
tribution, and promotion. 154
The tobacco industry successfully resisted meaningful regulation by
using advertising to shape norms of conduct and consumption with re-
companies are very protective of their data. Id. While often too complicated for general pub-
lic consumption, clinical trial data is useful to medical practitioners and academic scientists
who use it to compare drugs and determine possible side effects. Id. The industry, through its
lobbying trade group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRma),
has nevertheless advocated against the creation and enforcement of a federal registry for
clinical trial data.
150 See KLUGER, supra note 36, at 213.
151 See John P. Pierce et al., Smoking Initiative by Adolescent Girls, 1944 Through 1988,
271 JAMA 608 (1994) (reporting that the advent of Virginia Slims and other brands targeting
female smokers coincided with the sharp increase in teen girls smoking); Associated Press,
Tobacco Firm Targeted Teens, BALTIMoRE SuN, Jan. 15, 1998, at AI (reporting that according
to industry documents, R. J. Reynolds targeted adolescents as young as 13 and created a brand
designed to entice boys to smoke); Barry Meier, Painting a Target on Teen Smokers, SACRA-
mNTro BEE, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al (reporting that in 1988, R. J. Reynolds sought to advertise
heavily in places where teenagers congregate, including video game arcades, fast food restau-
rants, and outdoor sports venues); John Schwartz, Philip Morris Memos Detail Teen Habits,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at A15.
152 See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products is a Drug and These
Products are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 60
FED. REG. 41,314, 41,454, 41,787 (Aug. 11, 1995).
153 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th
Cir. 1998), ajftd, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
154 See The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, H.R. 1256, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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spect to smoking, until public health reformers effectively undermined
the norms of the market regime that had held the drug ensconced
there. 155 These reformers then reframed the drug in a way that resonated
with the disclosure norms of the public health regime, and have suc-
ceeded in shifting the drug into that regime. Today, cigarettes, once the
popular and socially approved drug of choice, are increasingly demon-
ized, and public smoking is anathema.156 Many states and local govern-
ments have enacted laws and ordinances regulating when and where
people can smoke, and at least one city-Calabasas, California-has
banned smoking in all public places, both indoor and outdoor, where
anyone might be exposed to second-hand smoke.157 Smoking is becom-
ing a marginalized practice, increasingly associated with lower educa-
tional and socioeconomic status. 158 And, as the Regulatory Regime/
Norms model makes clear, to the extent that tobacco is consumed prima-
rily by low-income and marginalized communities, if current trends con-
155 Virtually all of the bills introduced by federal legislators aimed at granting the FDA
explicit jurisdiction over tobacco products have been defeated. See H.R. 2147 & S. 672, 104th
Cong. (1993); H.R. 4350 & S. 2298, 103d Cong. (1992); H.R. 1494 & S. 769, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 3294, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 279, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 3317, 95th Cong.
(1978); H.R. 7168, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 3879, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 2419, 95th Cong.
(1977); S. 1682, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 5973, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 11280, 84th Cong.
(1956). In 1984, Congress amended the FCLAA to include the Comprehensive Smoking Edu-
cation Act. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat.
2200 (1984). In 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Educa-
tion Act (CSTHEA) to regulate the manufacture, packaging and distribution of smokeless to-
bacco products. See Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 2, 100 Stat. 30, 30-31 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4401-4408 (2001)). This law, however, did not provide the FDA with regulatory jurisdic-
tion over smokeless tobacco products. Id.
156 See Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in SMOKING
POLICY: LAW, POLrrTcs AND CULTURE 49 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
1993).
157 See Calabasas, Cal., Ordinance No. 2006-217, (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://
www.cityofcalabasas.com/pdf/agendas/council/2006/021506/item2-02006-217.pdf. The city
council in Calabasas, California unanimously enacted this anti-smoking ordinance in February
2006. Id. This ordinance permits fines of up to $5,000 for misdemeanor smoking violations,
making it the most stringent anti-smoking law in the country. See id. See also John M.
Broder, Smoking Ban Takes Effect, Indoors and Out, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/03/19/national/19smoke.html; Jordan Raphael, Note, The Calabasa Smok-
ing Ban: A Local Ordinance Points the Way for the Future of Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Regulation, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 393 (2007).
158 See BRANDT, supra note 126, at 308 ("Data from the Centers for Disease Control
showed smoking declining with levels of education: more than 40 percent of people who
dropped out of high school were smokers, compared to fifteen percent of those with college
degrees. On seeing these numbers, University of Michigan economist Kenneth Warner re-
marked that 'smoking related disease will increasingly become a class-based phenomenon.'").
See also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults -
United States 2007, 54 MoRBIDry & MORTALITY WKLY REP., 45, 1221-26 (2008), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5745a2.htm; Trish Hall, Smoking of
Cigarettes Seems to be Becoming a Lower-Class Habit, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1985, at Al.
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tinue, it is quite conceivable that tobacco may be criminalized one day in
the not too distant future. 159
C. Moving a Drug out of the Criminal Regime
Once a drug is assigned to and framed within a particular regime, it
is very difficult to reassign it to another regime because its social mean-
ing is quickly reinforced and consolidated. Yet, while regulatory re-
gimes exhibit a degree of continuity over time, drug placement in a
particular regime is rarely, if ever, fixed, stable, or uncontested. As the
Regulatory Regime/Norms model suggests, once the norms associated
with a drug and those of its regime no longer mesh, outward movement
of the drug from the regime becomes possible.
Thus, with respect to drugs that originate in the market regime -
such as tobacco, marijuana, and cocaine - reformers or government ac-
tors can overcome the liberal presumption against state intervention into
people's private affairs (the market default position) by successfully
characterizing the drug in a way that matches the norms of another regu-
latory regime. The case of AAS shows that the Regulatory Regime/
Norms model also explains the movement of commercially manufactured
pharmaceutical drugs out of the public health regime. But what about
drugs moving out of the criminal regulatory regime?
Unlike efforts to move a drug out of the market or public health
regime, whether a drug may move out of the criminal regulatory regime
is determined by moral norms and the social status of the drug's users.
As a result, if a drug is closely associated with a racialized or socially
maligned group, movement out of the criminal regulatory regime be-
comes significantly less likely to occur. Therefore, even if one is able to
successfully undermine the morally charged meaning attached to a drug
regulated in the criminal regime, the extent to which the drug is identi-
fied with racial minorities or other marginalized groups will determine
whether the drug will ultimately ever move from the regime.
The unique susceptibility of the criminal regime to moral norms
based on fear and blame renders its institutional boundaries porous with
respect to the in-migration of drugs associated with presumed deviations
from popularly accepted modes of moral conduct. If the drug, however,
is also identified with marginalized or racialized groups then this be-
comes a one-way porosity as this identification makes it not only more
likely that the drug will be criminalized, but also less likely that the drug
will be moved out of the criminal regime and into another regulatory
regime. For example, AAS are used primarily by professional and ama-
teur athletes, body builders, and teenagers who seek to enhance their ath-
159 See id.
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letic performance and physical appearance. 160 The fact that AAS are
used predominantly by these mainstream groups is the likely reason that
only unauthorized sale of AAS are illegal, while possession and con-
sumption are not. The Regulatory Regime/Norms theory suggests that
this is due to the social status of the users. That AAS possession was not
criminalized reflects the demographics of those who use the drug, while
the fact that distribution was criminalized is a function of the morally
charged context in which the substance was framed as a social problem.
Unlike the regulation of AAS, possession and distribution of co-
caine and marijuana were relegated squarely to the criminal regulatory
regime. Marijuana and cocaine were initially assigned to the criminal
regime because of allegations of crime and immorality associated with
the consumption of each drug. This, coupled with the fact that the users
were of low social status, ensured that possession as well as distribution
would be criminalized. Marijuana and cocaine enjoyed broad social ap-
peal and were widely consumed for both therapeutic and recreational
purposes until the early twentieth century. 161 Despite marijuana's 5,000
year medical history162 and the fact that cocaine could be found in every-
thing from medical elixirs to soft-drinks, once these drugs became asso-
ciated with presumed morally deviant behavior by maligned racial
groups such as Mexicans and African-Americans, they were abruptly
criminalized. 163 Regulators argued that cocaine use by African-Ameri-
cans and marijuana consumption by Mexicans caused members of these
groups to engage in deviant behavior and lawlessness. These claims
were readily accepted by the general public to the extent that they were
consistent with the morally charged, popular-political construction of
these groups.
Beginning in the 1960s and through the 1970s, it appeared that ma-
rijuana would move out of the criminal regime and into the market re-
gime due to two factors: (1) the efforts of a peaceful countercultural
movement and of marijuana legalization advocates to characterize the
drug in a way that was consonant with the norms of the market re-
gime, 164 and (2) the fact that these groups were comprised primarily of
160 See, e.g., Jarred R. Tynes, Comment, Performance Enhancing Substances, 27 J. LE-
GAL MED. 493, 493-94 (2006).
161 See generally supra Part IH.A (detailing the history of marijuana and cocaine in
medicine and recreation before the American government criminalized these drugs).
162 See LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D., & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIJUANA: THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 3 (2d ed. 1997).
163 See generally supra part M.A.
164 See HImELsTEIN, supra note 87, at 105-13, 122, 130-34; MYRON A. MARTY, DAILY
LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1990: DECADES OF DiscoRD 300-01 (1997). One of the
most notable drug legalization organization of the period was NORML (National Organization
to Reform Marijuana Laws). See ROBERT DEITCH, HEMp: AMERICAN HISTORY REVISITED: THE
PLANT WITH A DIVIDED HISTORY 179 (2003).
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white middle-class individuals. 165 During those decades, increasingly
prominent libertarian attitudes about the appropriate role of the state with
respect to individual conduct, increased social freedoms, and the general
permissiveness that became synonymous with that period, allowed these
groups to frame marijuana use as an expression of individual liberty and
personal choice, which resonated with the assumption of risk and rational
choice norms of the market regime. 166 Those groups were so successful
in framing marijuana use as an expression of personal liberty and the
drug itself as a substance responsible for little more than lethargy and
lassitude, that in 1973, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize
certain uses of marijuana, 167 and in 1977, President Jimmy Carter pub-
licly supported relaxing federal marijuana laws. 168
Although it seemed that public perception of marijuana was shifting
from condemnation to general tolerance, by the end of the decade the
drug would be pulled back from the brink of acceptance in a dramatic
shift in public and regulatory perception. The shift was primarily driven
by social conservative activists and "concerned parents" groups who suc-
ceeded in characterizing the drug as an integral part of a subversive and
socially deviant "hippie"/"drop-out" subculture responsible for the deg-
radation of main-stream cultural values, traditional sexual mores, and
prevailing gender roles. 169 At the time, scientists and others who offered
evidence that marijuana's medical risks were minimal and its effects on
users benign were unable to make their voices heard over the din of fear-
mongering, amplified by moral condemnation. 170 Such sentiments
would eventually help propel Ronald Reagan into the White House and
165 See HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 87, at 99-100, 106-11.
166 See MusTo, supra note 35, at 247-50.
167 See Albert DiChiara & John F. Galliher, Dissonance and Contradictions in the Ori-
gins of Marihuana Decriminalization, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1, 41 (1994).
168 President Jimmy Carter, Message to Congress (Aug. 2, 1977) ("Penalties against pos-
session of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug
itself.... Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against the possession of marijuana in
private for personal use."). See also DiChiara & Galliher, supra note 167, at 46.
169 See HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 87, at 4; MARTY, supra note 164, at 125; DiChiara &
Galliher, supra note 167, at 68. See also HurmELsTEIN, supra note 87, at 121-22, 144-45;
Youth: The Hippies, TIME, July 7, 1967, http://www.time.comtime/magazine/article/0,9171,89
9555,00.html (describing, if it were to exist, the Hippie code as "[d]o your own thing, wher-
ever you have to do it and whenever you want. Drop out. Leave society as you have known it.
Leave it utterly. Blow the mind of every straight person you can reach. Turn them on, if not
to drugs, then to beauty, love, honesty, fun."). The parents' movement against marijuana was
emboldened by the publication of the parent's handbook Parents, Peers, and Pot in 1979,
which claimed that marijuana caused numerous outlandish side effects (including sterility and
the transposing of the right and left sides of the brain) and was a "gateway" drug that leads to
hard drug use. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARUUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
PROHIBITION PoLrTcs 31-32 (2004).
170 See U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIJUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 152, 176 (1972). See generally Laura M. Rojas, California's Compas-
sionate Use Act and the Federal Government's Medical Marijuana Policy: Can California
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fuel his and subsequent administrations' protracted, morally-charged
"war on drugs" and "zero-tolerance" anti-marijuana campaigns. 171 Since
1996, the number of arrests for possessing marijuana has exceeded that
for any other type of drug. 172
Today, however, there is a concurrent tension between the emergent
medicalization of marijuana and the ongoing criminalization of the
drug. 173 According to the Regulatory Regime/Norms model, this is due
to the fact that marijuana is no longer associated in the public imagina-
tion with "dope fiend" Mexicans or "sexually deviant" hippies, but in-
stead with severely ill, middle class, white people. Since the 1990s, this
association has intensified interest in marijuana as medicine 174 and
helped the drug begin the process of migrating from the criminal regula-
tory regime into the public health regime. Indeed, several states have
enacted their own laws allowing legal access to the drug, particularly for
medicinal purposes. 175
Physicians Recommend Marijuana to Their Patients Without Subjecting Themselves to Sanc-
tions?, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 1373, 1380-81 (1999).
171 See DiChiara & Galliher, supra note 167, at 68; Rojas, supra note 170, at 1380.
172 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/tables/drugtype.htm (last viewed Nov. 9, 2009). See also
Symposium, Will Money Talk?:The Case for a Comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
War on Drugs, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 229, 230 (noting an increase in marijuana arrests
since 1980); Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Trafficking Penalties, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/dea/agency/penalties.htm.
173 An October 2009 Gallup poll revealed that while 44% of Americans favored mari-
juana legalization, 54% were opposed the idea. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Legalizing
Marijuana Reaches New High, GALLUP, Oct. 19 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/123728/
u.s.-support-legalizing-marijuana-reaches-new-high.aspx. Nevertheless, a 2005 nation-wide
Gallup poll showed 78% of people in the United States "supported making marijuana legally
available for doctors to prescribe in order to reduce pain and suffering." Joseph Carroll, Who
Supports Marijuana Legalization, GALLUP, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.gallup.com/poll/19561/
Who-Supports-Marijuana-Legalization.aspx.
174 Studies have demonstrated marijuana to be an effective treatment for chronic pain,
nausea, appetite loss, and other ailments experienced by people suffering from AIDS and the
effects of chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note
89, at 1875-76. Anecdotal evidence suggests that marijuana can provide relief for other con-
ditions, including glaucoma, epilepsy, neuralgia, asthma, cramps, migraine headaches, insom-
nia, phantom limb pain and depression. See id. at 1875. Marijuana is nontoxic, does not
appear to be addictive, and does not cause death by overdose, unlike alcohol, cocaine or her-
oin. See id. at 1876. Alcohol is more than 100 times more lethal than marijuana. Id. Delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in cannabis, is available as the Schedule H
synthetic drug, Marinol, which is a legally prescribed pill used to treat chronic pain and nau-
sea. Id. Many people suffering from AIDS, cancer, multiple sclerosis and chronic pain, how-
ever, contend that Marinol does not provide effective symptomatic relief for their conditions.
See id.
175 Thirteen states-Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Oregon-have
decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use, while keeping culti-
vation and distribution criminal offenses. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, No Rational
Basis: The Pragmatic Case for Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43, 73
n. 119 (2009) (noting that "[tihirteen states allow the simple possession of a small quantity of
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Unlike marijuana, however, the status of cocaine remains un-
changed, and the form of cocaine most closely associated with African-
Americans-crack cocaine-appears the least likely of any drug to move
out of the criminal regime. Crack offenses are punished much more
harshly than offenses involving any other drug, and are, in fact, punished
100 times more severely than offenses involving crack's pharmacologi-
cal twin, powder cocaine. 176 African-Americans have borne a dispropor-
tionate share of these severe penalties. This sentencing differential is the
result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 ADAA), which estab-
lished mandatory minimum penalties for individuals convicted of traf-
ficking in a variety of controlled substances based on the weight of the
drug used in the offense. 177
The 1986 ADAA mandatory minimum sentence guidelines dramati-
cally increased the length of time served by federal drug offenders and
apply to all scheduled narcotics. 78 Crack cocaine offenses, however,
received the most severe penalties. In fact, the quantity threshold for
crack cocaine that triggered a 5 and 10-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence was substantially lower than for even powder cocaine.179 This is
so notwithstanding that there is no difference between crack and powder
cocaine other than the way each drug is administered. 80 According to
the notorious 100:1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine sentencing,
marijuana for personal use to be treated as a civil infraction resulting in no arrest and no
criminal record); see also National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws, Marijuana
Decriminalization & Its Impact on Use, Feb. 27, 2010, http://norml.org/index.cfm?GroupID=
3383. Thirteen states - Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington-have legalized mari-
juana for medicinal purposes with a physician's approval. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII § 14
(2001); NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 38 (West 2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.010-17.37.090
(2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-
121-329-127 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRms.
LAW § 5-601(c)(3)(i) (West 2002); ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4473(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51.010-69.51.080 (West 2003); THE DRUG POLICY
FORUM OF HAWAII, THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA: A GUIDE TO HAWAII'S LAW FOR PHYSI-
CIANS, PATIENTS AND CAREGtVERS, 1, 1 (2001), available at http://dpfhi.org/docs/mmjbooklet.
pdf; Drug Policy Alliance Network, Medical Marijuana, http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana/
medical/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). However, in a pair of decisions addressing California's
medical marijuana law, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Controlled Substances Act
preempts state marijuana laws regarding manufacture and distribution by cannabis clubs and
local cultivation and use. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 30-33 (2005); United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001).
176 See generally note 4 and accompanying text (discussing disparate penalties between
crack and other forms of cocaine).
177 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
178 See id.
179 Id.
180 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) [hereinafter COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY].
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in order for a powder cocaine dealer to receive the same prison sentence
as someone who sold small quantities of crack cocaine, the powder co-
caine dealer would have to sell 100 times what the crack dealer sold. As
a result, in order to receive the mandatory ten-year trafficking sentence,
one would have to sell either fifty grams of crack or over 5,000 grams of
powder cocaine. Congress further expanded the disparity between pow-
der and crack cocaine when it passed the Controlled Substances Act,
which created mandatory minimum penalties for simple possession of a
controlled substance and, once again, distinguished crack from powder
cocaine and other narcotics. 181
Congress imposed the 100:1 ratio for crack vis i vis powder cocaine
during a period of pervasive, racially-tinged media reports linking crack
with gang violence, high rates of addiction, prostitution, child neglect
and "crack babies" flooding urban hospitals. 182 Such allegations cap-
tured the public's attention and inspired a moral panic, which allowed
legislators to substantiate the incendiary media reports conflating issues
of poverty, race, drugs, and crime by passing legislation based on little
scientific or medical evidence. 183 Indeed, the 1986 ADAA bypassed
committee and sped through Congress, which relied upon little empirical
data on cocaine in promulgating the Act and engaged in virtually no
debate. 184
Although the media frenzy has quieted and the crime and alleged
moral decay once attributed to crack has subsided, regulators remain un-
able to summon the political will to reduce the penalties attendant to a
181 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1994). According to the Controlled
Substances Act, simple possession of more than five grams of crack is punishable by a mini-
mum of five years in prison, while simple possession of any quantity of powder cocaine by a
first time offender is a misdemeanor punishable by no more than one year in prison. See id.
182 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION supra note 35 at 1-4.
183 See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sen-
tencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1233, 1249-50 (1996). Some legislators involved in the
enactment of the 1986 ADAA have suggested that the swift passage of the little-debated Act
was facilitated by the intensely strident and racially inflammatory tone of the media coverage
of crack cocaine and its link to urban crime. See id. at 1249-50. The Sentencing Commission
majority in 1995 wrote, "when the Commission began studying cocaine sentencing policy, it
found that the picture of crack painted by the media bore little resemblance to the reality
portrayed by scientific research on the subject." U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Statement of the
Comm'n Majority in Support of Recommended Changes in Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 312 (June 1, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Comm'n Statement].
184 At least one senator was disturbed by the rush to pass the bill. According to Senator
Evans, passage of the 1986 ADAA represented "the sanctimonious election stampede of the
House of Representatives, a stampede that trampled on the Constitution. In fact, at times the
action over there resembled a congressional lynch mob more than it did careful legislation."
132 CONG. REc. S13741-01 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Evans). There were
few hearings held in the House on increasing the penalties for crack offenses and the Senate
held only one hearing on the issue, which lasted less than four hours. U.S. SENrTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 9-
14 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 COMM'N REPORT].
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crack cocaine conviction. 185 The Regulatory Regime/Norms model indi-
cates that this is because black people are closely associated with crack
cocaine use and sale in the public imagination. 186 In 1992, at the height
of the crack and powder cocaine sentencing guidelines battle, 92.6% of
those convicted for federal crack cocaine offenses were black, while only
4.7% were white. 187 In comparison, during the same year, 45.2% of
those sentenced for powder cocaine offenses were white, while 20.7%
were black. 188 Although more whites ingest and sell crack than blacks,
fewer whites are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated for
crack cocaine offenses. 189 Indeed, in 2006, of all the federal crack co-
caine defendants, 81.8% were black. 190 The race differential between
crack and powder cocaine pervades every aspect of the criminal regula-
185 See COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY supra note 180, at viii. This report
also notes, inter alia: (1) there is no difference between crack and powder cocaine other than
the way they are administered; (2) the negative effects of prenatal crack cocaine exposure are
identical to the negative effects of prenatal powder cocaine exposure, both of which are "sig-
nificantly less severe than previously believed" and are, in fact, less damaging that the effects
of prenatal tobacco or alcohol exposure; (3) the "epidemic of crack use by youth never materi-
alized to the extent feared;" (4) crack cocaine use among students and young adults "histori-
cally has been low, particularly in relation to powder cocaine;" (5) the penalty system that
associated crack with violent crime was no longer accurate and therefore lacked adequate
sentencing proportionality. See id. at v-vii. See also Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack
Cocaine Sentence in a Post-Kimbrough World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 132-33 (2009) (dis-
cussing Congress' reluctance to fix the disparity; and that "[d]uring the 2007-2008 legislative
session, six crack cocaine reform bills were introduced," but that "most of the proposed legis-
lation appears to be at a standstill.").
186 See BONNmE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 35, at 12-13, 231, 241. See also Spade,
supra note 183, at 1255.
187 See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 786 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (citing U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission representative sample of all drug cases received for fiscal year 1993),
rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1182 (1995).
188 Id.
189 According to government data, overall drug use, abuse, and dependency rates are simi-
lar between all racial groups-with little variation between blacks and whites especially. See
RESULTS FROM THE 2007 NAT'L SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 75.
With regard to crack cocaine, however, white users significantly outnumber blacks in the latest
available data. See Office of Applied Studies, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 2003
Nat'l Survey on Drug Use & Health: Table 1.42a: Crack Use By Demographics (2003), http://
www.oas.samhsa.gov/Nhsda/2k3tabs/SectlpeTabslto66.htm#tabl.43a. Nevertheless, in 2006,
81.8% of federal crack cocaine offenders were black. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 15 (2007),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/r.-congress/cocaine2007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 CoMM'N RE-
PORT]. According to another recent federal study, blacks outnumbered whites by more than
four to one as suspects arrested by Drug Enforcement Administration agents on crack cocaine
charges. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics
2006-Statistical Tables: Table 1.4 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/htmlI/fjsst/2006/
tables/fjs06stl04.pdf. Black male drug offenders also have a 20% greater chance of being
imprisoned than white male offenders. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING CONM'N, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 122 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15-year/15-
year.studyjull.pdf.
190 See 2007 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 189, at 15.
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tory regime, from arrest and prosecution to sentencing and incarcera-
tion. 19' For example, although the DEA in 2003 made almost double the
number of arrests for powder cocaine as for crack cocaine, the number of
defendants ultimately sentenced was nearly equal. 92
In 1995, the U.S. Sentencing Commission-an independent biparti-
san body endowed with a mandate to promulgate a system of mandatory
sentencing guidelines on the appropriate form and degree of punishment
for those convicted of federal crimes-concluded that "fundamental fair-
ness" dictates that crack and powder be treated equally. 193 The Commis-
sion reiterated this determination in several subsequent reports and
"strongly" recommended changing the sentencing guidelines to eliminate
the sentencing differential between the drugs by raising the threshold for
crack. 194 Congress responded by rejecting the Commission's propos-
191 See id. at 15-16.
192 See INDIANA STATE EPIDEMIOLOGY AND OUTCOMES WORKGROUP, THE CONSUMPTION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND DRUGS IN INDIANA: A STATE EPIDEMIOLOGI-
CAL PROFILE 89 (2006), available at http:/lwww.policyarchive.orglhandlell0207bitstreams/
120.pdf. Moreover, between October 1, 2001 and September 30, 2002, there were 7,261 ar-
rests for powder cocaine and 4,400 arrests for crack cocaine. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 18 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0201.pdf.
193 See 1995 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 184, at xiv ("Given the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, the most efficient and effective way for Congress to direct cocaine sentencing policy
is through the established process of sentencing guidelines, rather than relying solely on statu-
tory distinction between the two forms of the same drug."). The Commission concluded, "we
were unable to establish that these social problems [attendant to crack use] result from the drug
itself rather than from the disadvantaged social and economic environment in which the drug
often is used. We note that these problems are not unique to crack cocaine, but are associated
to some extent with abuse of any drug or alcohol." 1995 Comm'n Statement, supra note 183,
at 316. The Commission stated further that it did not believe "that longer punishment can be
justified solely because a particular form of a drug is more likely to be used by a disadvan-
taged population." Id. Thus, in 1995, the Commission approved amendments to the guide-
lines equalizing the guideline's treatment of powder and crack cocaine and recommended that
Congress do the same with the statutory minimum. Id. at 317.
194 See 1995 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 184, at 198 ("The commission strongly recom-
mends against a 100-to-I quantity ratio."). See also 2002 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 180, at
viii ("[Tihe Commission again unanimously and firmly concludes that the various congres-
sional objectives can be achieved more effectively by decreasing substantially the 100-to-I
drug quantity ratio."). In its April 1997 report, the Commission concluded that the 100:1 ratio
was unjustifiable, noting that all cocaine is initially distributed in powder form and is only later
processed into crack. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CO-
CAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 5 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COMM'N REPORT]. The
Commission proposed equalizing the penalties for simple possession of crack and powder
cocaine. Id. at 10. It also recommended that the five-year mandatory minimum sentence
threshold be raised for crack and lowered for cocaine. Id. at 2. Citing evidence that the cur-
rent five gram threshold disproportionately targeted low-level street dealers, id. at 5, the Com-
mission proposed raising the five-year mandatory minimum sentence threshold for crack from
five grams to 25-75 grams and recommended lowering the threshold for powder cocaine from
500 grams to 125-375 grams, Id. at 2. Thus, the 100:1 ratio between powder and crack
cocaine would approximately be replaced with a 5:1 ratio. The Commission reasoned that: (1)
the sentencing guidelines already provide substantial penalties for aggravating factors attend-
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als-for the first time since the guidelines were enacted-and stipulated
that any future proposal to modify the sentencing guidelines must not
give equal treatment to offenses involving equal quantities of crack and
powder cocaine. 195
Despite recent moves by the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal
Sentencing Commission to equalize the treatment of crack and powder
cocaine, Congress has yet to act. 196 Only Congress has the ultimate au-
thority to amend the sentencing disparity in the 1986 ADAA, which
mandates punishing crack cocaine offenses 100 times more severely than
those for powder cocaine, and so far, it has refused to do so. 197 The
Regulatory Regime/Norms model makes clear that so long as the sale
and use of crack cocaine remain popularly associated with poor African-
Americans, the drug will stay in the criminal regime.
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD
This Article addresses fundamental questions that previous scholar-
ship has neglected: how regulators are able to treat drugs differently irre-
spective of the dangers they may pose, and the processes followed to
ant to trafficking in powder cocaine, id. at 6; (2) crack and powder cocaine have the same
active ingredient and produce the same physiological and psychotropic effect, 2002 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 180, at v; (3) the addictive potential of the various forms of cocaine were
based on the methods of administration and not anything intrinsic to the drug, 1997 COMM'N
REPORT, supra, at 4; and (4) that punishing low-level crack dealers as opposed to the more
sophisticated and powerful wholesale distributors of powder cocaine from which crack is de-
rived was unfair and inconsistent with the underlying goals of the criminal justice system, id.
at 5. The Commission further noted that most drug dealers traffic in multiple drugs and that
crack cocaine distributions frequently involve powder cocaine as well. 1995 Comm'n State-
ment, supra note 183, at 317. The Commission suggested that imposing higher penalties for
crack "ignores the realty of these polydrug distributions and the risks associated with the other
drugs present in a 'crack cocaine' distribution." Id.
195 See Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman, Federal Cocaine Sentencing in
Transition, 19 FED. SENTENCING REP. 291, 292 (2007), available at http://sentencing.typepad.
com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/crack ed obsfsrl9.5.pdf. See also Sentencing
Comm'n Again Seeks Input on Sentences for Crack, Money Laundering, 58 CRIM. L. REP.
1319, 1320 (1996).
t96 See 2007 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 189, at 1. In two 2007 decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that federal judges have broad discretion to set aside the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines to impose sentences based on their assessment of a particular offense and defen-
dant. Harry Sandick, Gall and Kimbrough and Their Relevance to Sentencing in White-Collar
Cases, 20 FED. SENTENCING REP. 159, 159 (2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38
(2007) and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)). Both cases involved trial court
judges whose decisions were overturned on appeal after they imposed sentences lighter than
those recommended by the guidelines. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110-11
(2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59-60 (2007). The following day, the Sentencing
Commission voted unanimously to decrease, retroactively, the sentences for crack cocaine
offenses, thereby reducing the 100:1 ratio. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for Crack Co-
caine Offenses (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/re1121107.htm.
197 See Cassidy, supra note 185, at 132.
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achieve this phenomenon. It offers a conceptual framework that explains
how drug regulators segue from the default position of deferring to per-
sonal choice and market forces, to regulation, criminalization and prohi-
bition, without relying upon scientific or medical evidence regarding the
pharmacological properties of the drug. This framework is then applied
to the regulation of four common pharmaceutical, illicit, and over-the-
counter drugs: cocaine, marijuana, tobacco, and anabolic steroids.
As this Article demonstrates, the pharmacological effect of a drug
does not necessarily determine how it will be governed. Rather, it is the
way a drug is framed that determines how the drug will be popularly
understood and ultimately regulated. According to the Regulatory Re-
gime/Norms model, the meaning of any drug (how it is perceived or
understood) is initially ambiguous and indeterminate. As a result, the
project of getting a drug into a particular regulatory regime is about allo-
cating specific meaning and significance to the drug in order to prompt
individuals to think and feel about the drug in a way that allows for
regime placement. This is accomplished by framing a drug to match the
norms of a particular regime. Thus, the critical work at the level of regu-
lation is in the framing.
Framing battles are ongoing since the meaning of a drug is always
open to contest and debate. This study demonstrates, for example, that it
is not uncommon for the same drug to be signified over time in many,
often conflicting, ways. "Reefer-madness," "killer-weed," and "medical-
marijuana," all refer to the same drug-marijuana, but it has been framed
differently to conform to the specific norms of two distinct regimes.
Similarly, tobacco began as a drug with little significance and was subse-
quently framed unsuccessfully as a moral hazard, then, quite persua-
sively, as a symbol of freedom and independence, and is now
characterized as a public health menace.
Once a group has convincingly framed a drug in a way that reso-
nates with the norms of its regime of choice, then the drug may be placed
in that regime, regardless of whether the designation decision is sup-
ported by scientific or medical evidence. As we have seen with cocaine,
marijuana, and anabolic steroids, however, if a drug in the criminal regu-
latory regime is closely associated with socially maligned groups or ra-
cial minorities, then it is substantially more difficult for the drug to
eventually migrate out of the regime.
The framing process is not always straight-forward and uncompli-
cated. This is particularly evident when we look at the role of the indi-
vidual within the groups that engage in these framing battles. I posit that
most, if not all, individuals within the groups that compete to control the
meaning of drugs know in advance what they would like the drug to
mean, which is to say, how they would like the drug to be regulated.
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Indeed, their common understanding of the drug's meaning is what drew
them to the group in the first instance and what motivates them to coordi-
nate and endeavor to shape the meaning of the drug. These individuals,
however, may or may not be fully aware of the framing process: the
explicit framing of a particular drug to match the norms of a particular
regime. For example, as I have demonstrated, corporate actors realize
the power and efficacy of framing a drug to fit the norms of the market
regime and know all too well how to achieve that regime placement.1 98
The same may be said of at least some individuals who join groups that
aim to criminalize drugs or that seek to ensure public health regulation of
drugs. 199
Other individuals, however, may not be explicitly aware of an indi-
vidual regime's norms or governing principles. For instance, some advo-
cates who oppose either the legalization or criminalization of a certain
drug may not realize that stressing disclosure principles will significantly
increase the likelihood that the drug will be subject to public health regu-
lation. While these same individuals most likely expect disclosure from
public health entities and understand that moral norms play a significant
role in the criminal regime, they may be unable able to explicitly articu-
late those norms or governing principles in relation to the role they play
in drug regulation. In this way, the framing process can be messy and
chaotic, but this dynamic is what also allows the efforts of those who
consciously participate in the framing process to often go unnoticed on a
broader social level.
The Regulatory Regime/Norms theory is a testable model that has
important normative implications for policymakers and lawmakers. By
revealing the way drugs are placed in regulatory regimes, this model
helps us see clearly how and why the current U.S. system of drug regula-
tion is so inconsistent and seemingly incoherent, which is the first step
towards devising appropriate policy solutions and a more transparent and
principled system of drug control. Indeed, although drug regulatory
processes are not value-neutral and therefore cannot be completely insu-
lated from politics, an understanding of the role of framing in these
processes can help guard against the distortion of drug regulation by mis-
information, bad science, or racial prejudice,
This Article exposes and explains the process through which drug
regulatory decisions are made, which is critically important as the ulti-
mate placement of a drug in a regime has wide-reaching material conse-
quences for those who are regulated and the corporate entities, private
reformers and government actors who compete to have a drug assigned
to one regime over another. For example, billions of dollars were at
198 See infra Part IIB.
199 See infra Part HI.A.
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stake for tobacco manufacturers as they struggled to characterize their
drug in a way that would keep it from shifting from the market regime
into the public health regime. Similarly, even though many drugs are
relegated to the criminal regime based on little or no empirical evidence,
this regime placement has substantial, real-world ramifications for those
convicted of a felony drug offense, who face not only the possibility of a
long prison term, but may be denied the right to vote, removed from
public housing and denied eligibility for federal entitlements, such as
public assistance benefits, student loans and food stamps.
The theory advanced in this Article also has implications for activ-
ists seeking to effect legal change with respect to drugs. To the extent
that framing influences popular attitudes towards drugs and drug use,
activists would be wise to place less emphasis on lobbying legislators
and policymakers by relying upon scientific data on drugs, and instead
place greater emphasis on framing the issue in a way that matches the
norms of the regime they prefer, and then spreading their message di-
rectly to citizens in order to shape public understanding of the drug. In-
deed, according to the Regulatory Regime/Norms model, science can be
brought to bear on the meaning of drugs and it can influence how the
drug will be regulated, but its influence is not dispositive. Science is but
one resource in the commercial, cultural, and political battle over mean-
ing. Thus, those who seek to change the regulatory status of a particular
drug should focus on the framing in conjunction with proving the valid-
ity of their scientific evidence.
The Regulatory Regime/Norms model also holds substantial signifi-
cance for the study of drug regulation. By identifying the framing pro-
cess and the specific norms and principles that structure each regime, the
Regulatory Regime/Norms model suggests not only how different sub-
stances are conceived of and structured as open to regulation, but it also
helps us see more clearly the aims and concerns of the public and private
entities that engage in these drug placement contests. Thus, the model
provides a useful analytical lens with which to investigate the fluidity,
multidimensionality, and ubiquity of state and private efforts to govern
drug use, and it illuminates the operation of power in contemporary drug
regulation.
This Article is but a point of departure as I intend to continue inves-
tigating regulatory regimes generally, and drug regulatory regimes spe-
cifically, including applying the Regulatory Regime/Norms model to
additional drugs. Through the Regulatory Regime/Norms framework, I
seek to inspire a re-imagining of the way social, political, and economic
power can and should be exercised in and through regulatory regimes. It
is my hope that this Article invites further research into drug regulation
as a specific and penetrating mode of governance.
